Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Elizabeth Warren's Flawed WSJ Editorial
"Banking is based on trust. The banks get our paychecks and hold our savings; they know where we spend our money and they keep it private. If we don't trust them, the whole system breaks down. Yet for years, Wall Street CEOs have thrown away customer trust like so much worthless trash.
Banks and brokers have sold deceptive mortgages for more than a decade. Financial wizards made billions by packaging and repackaging those loans into securities. And federal regulators played the role of lookout at a bank robbery, holding back anyone who tried to stop the massive looting from middle-class families. When they weren't selling deceptive mortgages, Wall Street invented new credit card tricks and clever overdraft fees.
In October 2008, when all the risks accumulated and the economy went into a tailspin, Wall Street CEOs squandered what little trust was left when they accepted taxpayer bailouts. As the economy stabilized and it seemed like we would change the rules that got us into this crisis—including the rules that let big banks trick their customers for so many years—it looked like things might come out all right.
Now, a year later, President Obama's proposals for reform are bottled up in the Senate. The same Wall Street CEOs who brought the economy to its knees have spent more than a year and hundreds of millions of dollars furiously lobbying Washington to kill the president's proposal for a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (CFPA). "
It's obvious that Warren confuses commercial banking with investment banking and securities brokerages. Thus, she paints the entire financial sector with a brush that is largely meant for a few investment banks and the securities units of perhaps one commercial bank, Citigroup.
Warren then goes on, in her second paragraph, to conveniently omit the actions of various government actors, including Barney Frank, Chris Dodd, Kent Conrad, and former HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo, all of whom mandated GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy and securitize questionable, risky mortgages.
Private sector, publicly-held investment and commercial banks were only following the lead of Washington. But Warren doesn't choose to acknowledge this fact.
Warren then characterizes all banks which received TARP funds as needing a bailout, which is very far from the truth. Anyone alive two years ago and watching the scene unfold knows that, in order to be able to unwisely inject federal funds into a few ailing financial institutions, specifically Morgan Stanley and Citigroup, then-Treasury Secretary Paulson forced a larger number of financial institutions to accept federal money. The reason given was to not stigmatize, in the eyes of the investing public, those institutions clearly about to fail without the infusion.
What you, as a reader of this blog, ought to understand from Warren's statements in her editorial is that the appointed leader of the Congressional witch hunt that is the TARP Oversight Panel can't even get the facts straight regarding the history of events which led to the creation of the TARP.
Later in Warren's editorial, she writes,
"So far, Wall Street CEOs seem determined to stop any kind of watchdog. They seem to think that they can run their businesses forever without our trust. This is a bad calculation.
It's a bad calculation because shareholders suffer enormously from the long-term cost of the boom-and- bust cycles that accompany a poorly regulated market. J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon recently explained this brave new world, saying that crises should be expected "every five to seven years."
He is wrong. New laws that came out of the Great Depression ended 150 years of boom-and-bust cycles and gave us 50 years with virtually no financial meltdowns. The stability ended as we dismantled those laws and failed to replace them with new laws that reflected modern business practices. "
As Ronald Reagan might say, were he alive,
"There she goes again!"
First, Warren continues to use the phrase "Wall Street," to refer to large financial institutions. But that term was originally meant to apply to investment banks and brokerages. None of which now exist as large institutions. Only boutique investment banks remain.
The remaining former investment banks- Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley- rushed to take bank charters. Merrill was sold to BofA, while Lehman and Bear Stearns collapsed.
Leaving that topic of Warren's misinformation, it's probably unfair of her to contend that the CEOs of the nation's remaining large financial institutions, all of which are now commercial banks, don't want any regulation or the trust of their customers.
As stupid as some of these CEOs are, they're not that stupid.
Warren is correct to note that Jamie Dimon's statement should be wrong. It's not really correct to say it "is" wrong, but it should be a wrong statement.
That said, Dimon is hardly the person you'd look to for a sense of history in financial markets. He spent his formative years carrying Sandy Weill's bags. It's notable, then, to observe that Dimon's mentor created what has probably been the single worst-run integrated financial services company, Citigroup. What, exactly, did Dimon learn from that which is so valuable?
However, Warren is wrong. And in a way that Dimon wasn't in his statement.
To write that we have had "50 years with virtually no financial meltdowns" is "virtually" meaningless.
Either there were meltdowns, Elizabeth, or there weren't. Which is it?
By the way, it is "were."
Since Warren is referring to "Wall Street" in her piece, let's start with the go-go Nifty Fifty Era in the late 1960s. And it's contemporary scandal, the mutual fund collapse of Bernie Cornfeld.
Then we had the S&L crisis of the late 1980s, during which era the first CMOs were spawned.
Let's not forget the internet stock bubble of the late 1990s. Which followed the near-meltdown arising from LTCM's collapse.
Read enough?
Evidently Elizabeth Warren doesn't know any history of the sector of which she now writes with so much apparent authority.
Warren continues to the end of her article savaging "Wall Street CEOs" as being against new regulation. Which regulation, of course, is all pure good and truth. She paints the aforementioned CEOs as evil, greedy and only desirous of slipping the regulatory noose and caring not a wit for the trust of their customers.
As I've written in prior posts, these constant appeals for just one more perfect regulatory scheme to prevent the next financial crisis reflect serious misunderstandings, or total lack of understanding, of the behavior of those involved in trading and underwriting businesses.
Old-fashioned, conventional commercial lending businesses, be they consumer or business, are fairly predictable and cyclic in their mistakes. We have sufficient regulations in place to oversee those activities. What we haven't had is effective implementation of existing regulations.
As to the underwriting and trading businesses, it's a different ballgame. Volcker is correct in calling for a complete separation of these activities from federally-insured deposit-taking institutions.
What Warren, and others, fail to understand is that there is only one motive for people in those businesses: profit. It's up to their counterparties and customers, and, in fact, anyone who deals with them, to beware. No amount of regulation will ever make them "safe" with which to do business.
Best they be sequestered in their own shark tank.
Think of the worst, most risky and rapacious behavior possible in underwriting and trading securities, and you are near right in guessing the extremes to which the best professionals in these businesses will go to make money.
This will never change. Believing it can be made to be otherwise is perhaps Elizabeth Warren's editorial's most significant flaw.
Tuesday, February 09, 2010
Pfizer's Bad Example: CEO Jeff Kindler
I've written in earlier posts concerning the auto company bailouts that both government and corporate executives have unwisely failed to observe a separation that ought to remain.
Specifically, corporations ought not seek government aid, and government ought not give it.
Yet, from reading Strassel's editorial, it appears that Kindler did exactly that by pandering to the administration's and Congress' coercive threats, to be embodied in last year's failed health care bill.
Strassel details how Kindler, upon arriving at Pfizer, suddenly oversaw the retirement of free-market oriented governmenat affairs personnel, and magically hired people with ties to various Democratic powers, current and out of office.
In a variant of requesting aid for his firm, Kindler caved in to Congress on opposing the socialization of medicine, in exchange for protection from threats like drug reimportation, guarantees of purchase of branded drugs by the government, and no price controls.
Then, as Strassel carefully notes, Congress reversed itself as the going got tough. Now, reimportation is back on the table, as are Medicare drug price controls and new limits on certain pharma patents.
This just goes to show how dangerous it is for the private sector to succumb to Congressional coercion and, worse, try to jump into bed with that branch in order to trade favors.
It's always far better for industry to aggressively defend and express its own views contrary to government's. The risk to business is that, having given in on some key aspects of a business model, the impression is that the firm was either lying in the past about its business processes, or didn't really need some practice it vociferously defended.
Now, thanks largely to Kindler, Big Pharma is left looking like they agreed with Congress on many issues which are, in fact, key to their current business models.
Perhaps Pfizer's board should have been more careful in choosing its new CEO and so radically changing its pro-free market orientation.
Monday, February 08, 2010
Scott Patterson's "The Quants"
So far, about 1/5th of the way through Patterson's work, I would give it a huge, unequivocal "buy and hold" rating.
The excerpt was a very representative sample of his writing. But the book is much, much better than the excerpt could possibly convey.
Patterson writes in a style reminiscent of Michael Lewis crossed with Tom Wolfe. He digs deeply into the roots of quantitative trading, providing very interesting stories of Ed Thorp and his own mathematical predecessors.
Having worked at AT&T, and knowing of Claude Shannon's impact on information theory and computing, I was delighted to read of his chance involvement with Thorpe's own early work.
In any case, my early verdict is that the book is well worth buying/reading.
Cuomo, Lewis, Paulson & Bernanke...and the Martin Act
I had a very spirited debate about this case with my business partner yesterday morning.
My partner's opinion is that what is done, is done. Let's not waste time and money picking through the wreckage of a done deal that has, by the way, actually turned out profitably for BofA. Government if full of thugs who wield too much power, usually coercively, and this case won't change that.
In fact, he noted, even Ken Lewis doesn't want his day of reckoning in court.
I have a different perspective. I welcome the opportunity for a trial in which Lewis, probably John Thain, Ben Bernanke and Hank Paulson can all be made to tell the truth, under oath, about their actions in this mess.
The motives of everyone are quite transparent:
Andrew Cuomo- currently thuggish AG of NY, badly wanting to follow Eliot Spitzer to the governorship on the back of this sensational case.
Ken Lewis- hapless, gutless former CEO of BofA who folded like a house of cards under pressure from Bernanke and Paulson, probably violating a slew of SEC regulations involving his fiduciary duty to his shareholders.
Hank Paulson & Ben Bernanke- probably engaged in illegal, improper and coercive behavior to force Lewis, against his wishes, to complete the Merrill Lynch purchase and deceive his shareholders regarding the total cost of the deal and Merrill's losses.
John Thain- recently-hired CEO of failed CIT, wants desperately to publicly clear his name in the Merrill Lynch affair.
Ideally, this trial will illuminate just who did what. From the various media accounts, someone is lying.
Bernanke and Paulson deny strong-arming Lewis. Lewis claims he didn't want to consummate the deal, but was forced to do so by Bernanke and Paulson. Thain claims he told Lewis about the losses and bonuses at Merrill. They can't all be telling the truth.
Ironically, as today's lead Journal staff editorial notes, Cuomo is personally responsible for having touched off the financial meltdown by setting higher percentages of low-income mortgages to securitize at Fannie and Freddie, while lowering downpayments.
In the recent Journal editorial, however, they made a rare mistake, claiming that because Merrill made some money for BofA last year, the deal was thus a good one. Really?
Doesn't it matter what the final purchase price was, and how much money was made? It's not clear yet whether Lewis' final string of acquisitions, including Countrywide and Merrill, will actually prove to be accretive. Maybe, with the fungibility of federal loans, we'll never know.
What better day of reckoning for the lot of them than a public courtroom and sworn testimony?
If everything goes well, there should be some perjury charges coming against someone or ones.
As I said to my business partner, I believe it's important for the public to see, if true, how federal officials Paulson and Bernanke improperly used their positions to coerce private company executives. If they abused their power, it should be made public, and they should be charged and convicted of said offenses.
We'll never curb abuses of power by high-level federal officials without making examples of those who misbehave. No matter if the events are now in the past.
Were someone with omniscience to inform us all, here's what I believe we'd learn:
-Ken Lewis abdicated his fiduciary duties to his shareholders, in order to keep his job.
-Bernanke and Paulson illegally coerced Lewis to behave improperly, keeping his shareholders ignorant of important new risks in the Merrill Lynch transaction
-John Thain informed Lewis and his BofA team of the losses Merrill was incurring, and the bonuses planned to be paid to Merrill personnel.
I may be wrong. But those are my contentions.
If I'm right, Lewis, Bernanke, Paulson and maybe Lewis' CFO should all, ideally, be wearing orange suits and raking sand traps at Allenwood.
Friday, February 05, 2010
On Risk & Capital Allocation In Commercial Banking
Like every other business, banks are sensitive to the costs of capital, and, following basic economics, which is about rationing scarce resources, their managements want to use the absolute minimum to do their business.
Back in the late 1980s, RAROC (Risk Adjusted Return On Capital) was developed at Bankers Trust's. It is, or was, the original risk management tool for bank capital allocation. From it, and its design team, flowed many of the modern variants of VAR-style risk metric systems in financial services firms.
While working on resource allocation and productivity at Chase Manhattan, it was necessary to address risk capital. Thus, I retained the developer of Bankers Trust's famous RAROC model, Philippe Geneste, as a consultant to assist us in introducing the concepts into resource allocation at Chase, as well as to better understand its likely ramifications on business unit operating decisions and overall bank profitability.
There were, and are, fundamentally two methods to internally adjust for risk. One is to raise required rates of return for businesses, on notionally-allocated capital. The other is to use some variance-based approach to allocate more capital to riskier businesses, where risk is defined by greater variances in returns, or losses, of the business.
When dealing with risk, internal capital and allocation, one rapidly runs into a conundrum. It was on display yesterday morning on CNBC, where a guest, no less than Bill Gross of PIMCO, was opining on the need to make banks carry as much capital as possible to mitigate risk.
Here's the problem.
Internally, business units decline to accept capital allocations. They will claim to not need as much as is allocated. But, from a corporate viewpoint, the regulatory-mandated capital has to be allocated. Otherwise, one is in the position of having unallocated, in effect fallow capital. Capital that has been raised and is being paid for, whether through interest or implied total return to shareholders.
In the normal course of business, probably 95% of the time, that added regulatory capital buffer is unnecessary. It constitutes a drag on bank earnings and returns to shareholders.
Of course, in rare circumstances, like those of late 2008, losses in various units of a bank can skyrocket. But, when those so-called black swans appear, even the excess regulatorily-mandated capital levels are unlikely to be sufficient to absorb the losses.
If you look closely at a commercial bank, such as Chase, you'll see that even today, it's common equity/total assets ratio is only about 8%. An incredibly thin wedge of pure equity is in that ratio, as preferred equity outweighs common by about 10:1.
It doesn't take a genius to see how fast a commercial bank can lose substantial equity and become insolvent from a particularly big valuation hit in one or two businesses.
Yet, if regulators force a commercial bank to carry more equity, they inevitably depress profitability and returns. Bank CEOs want to believe their institutions can offer total returns which are competitive with industrial firms. But, if regulators have their way, this can't and won't be true.
Like it or not, fractional reserve banking systems and commercial banks' participation in modern capital markets as publicly-owned entities virtually guarantees that big risk mistakes on their part will quickly lead to insolvency. The banks won't carry more capital than they are forced to, yet, given the risks they take, they are occasionally going to burn through that thin wedge of equity.
Debating about a few percentage points of capital won't really change that.
Thursday, February 04, 2010
The False Hope of a New Financial Resolution Authority
I saw this again yesterday morning, as Senator Bob Corker, R-Tenn, reiterated Volcker's belief that, no matter what else the Senate does, they'll create some new entity to put 'banks which are near failing' into some sort of regulatory limbo, to avoid systemic repercussions.
As I discussed this topic yesterday with a colleague, I asked whether he saw things as I did.
To wit, consider Bear Stearns. When Bear went out of business, its financial condition deteriorated in a matter of only days. And the worse the rumors became, the more counterparties began pulling their business. Add to this the fact that modern investment banks are primarily funded with short-term borrowed money from broker dealer desks at commercial banks, and you have situations in which a company can become insolvent literally overnight.
Forget, for a moment, for argument's sake, the fact that Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are now, technically, commercial banks with access to the Fed window.
In markets as far back as 1998, when Long Term Capital Management failed, here is how non-commercial banks become insolvent.
A broker or investment bank takes positions in securities. The positions may be on a trading desk, or they may be, as was the case with First Boston some 20 years ago, underwritten debt from a funding transaction on behalf of a client, e.g., Ohio Mattress.
Suddenly, the securities begin to lose value. A lot of value. Marked-to-market values plummet, destroying the firm's equity deployed to the desk at breakneck speed. Since the firm is highly-leveraged, its counterparties react by either requiring more collateral on losing positions funded with their money, or, if a general lender, perhaps cutting credit lines.
As word begins to circulate, within hours, of the firms' losses and emerging credit pressures, counterparties shun the firm, and clients remove money from accounts with them, so as to not risk its being tied up in a bankruptcy.
Perhaps only a day later, as assets drain from the firm's balance sheet, and trading volumes shrink, the firm's positions, after the 4PM market close, show that it cannot settle all of its trades, because it has lost credit lines, has too little cash to honor its commitments, and cannot quickly borrow enough to fund them.
For any 'resolution authority' to be credible and effective, it would have to have a representative on site, at the firm, observing the insolvency as of the 4PM markets close.
Seeing the inability of the firm to settle its trades and, with resulting trading and other asset values, post a positive equity value by the market open on the following morning, the authority would have to call a halt to all financial flows from the firm, and declare it failed.
That's effectively what happened to Bear, and Lehman. When the end comes, it can be a matter of hours. But notice that only 24 hours earlier, the firm wasn't insolvent. So shutting it would have probably been an illegal government taking of private property.
If what is being suggested is having regulators on site at each major, and perhaps even minor/boutique financial service firm, that can already be done with Fed, FDIC and OTC regulators. It's not a matter of requiring a new resolution authority, but, rather, acknowledging the context in which such closures would have to occur.
Regulators would have to be viewing the firm's books, current financial and trading positions in near-real time.
As I listened to Volcker and Corker, I heard, instead, a sort of semi-languid tone suggesting that someone from Washington would board a plane to visit the troubled firm and see what was going on.
In the real world, there's just not that much time. The unremarked upon reactions of trading counterparties to ailing and failing institutions is what seems to be unacknowledged by legislators and regulators.
There's a fine line between government seizure, without basis, of an about-to-fail institution, and the closure of an insolvent one. But if the government sends clear signals that no financial institutions that fails will, beyond deposit insurance, be assisted in any way, you can rest assured that counterparties will look after their own risks.
The Constitution specifies bankruptcy for failed firms. For some reason, regulators no longer wish to use that option.
As my colleague and I discussed this topic, we wondered why so many people believe that Lehman's failure could have destroyed the US and, possibly, global financial system.
What if, instead of everyone's worst fears, Lehman's regulator simply stepped in and declared it bankrupt, froze its assets, appointed a trustee, and, like Drexel Burnham Lambert years ago, went about the long and complex task of sorting it all out under court protection?
Or Bear Stearns? Rather than let Chase steal the firm, first for about $2/share, then, grudgingly, about $11/share, how about simply letting a bankruptcy trustee and court freeze the firm's assets and begin to settle its liabilities? If there were value remaining at the end, it could be auctioned to the highest bidder.
Not some large bank which extracted a government loss-protection guarantee as it paid a lowest-possible bid to 'rescue' the firm.
It all boils down to expectations. If market participants believe that a failing financial services firm will be allowed to do so, and enter bankruptcy proceedings, then they will take appropriate steps to limit their exposure.
If, however, government officials run around wringing their hands and declaring each possible failure to put the nation's financial system at risk, then market participants will behave differently.
The most effective, disciplined, and efficient method of removing systemic risk from individual financial service firm failures, regardless of their size and nature, is for government to warn market participants that conventional bankruptcy will be the only option, and action, for failed companies.
No government intervention prior to that event. No quick sweetheart sales to large competitors. No stripping off and selling of choice business units. No emergency loans from the Fed.
Nothing.
Do that, and watch how the system's players move to protect themselves from any systemic catastrophes in the future.
Wednesday, February 03, 2010
James Lockhart's Disingenuous Claims
Lockhart's comments provided an ideal example of how federal regulators, Congressmen and administration officials, both former and current, twist and misrepresent history in their quest to appear blameless, heroic and successful.
In Lockhart's case, he contrasted his office's takeover of Fannie and Freddie, whose oversight he bungled in the first place, with Lehman's demise.
Crowing proudly, Lockhart claimed that there was no systemic shock from his handling of the two GSEs as his regulatory office placed them into "conservatorship," while Lehman's poorly-handled bankruptcy had a catastrophic impact on financial markets.
Of course, Lockhart conveniently glossed over the fact that his and Paulsen's actions meant that the Federal government guaranteed Fannie's and Freddie's obligations, thus removing any need for financial markets to panic.
But there was Lockhart, grinning and taking credit for what was actually caused by your and my role as taxpayers.
Lockhart also failed to mention the continuing losses stemming from the GSEs' operations, and the recent action by Geithner to uncap taxpayer exposure to their losses going forward.
That's success, Jim? I'd hate to see the cost of a failure in handling Fannie and Freddie.
Following Lockhart's dissembling on the matter of Fannie and Freddie, a CNBC anchor asked him if, in his new capacity as Vice-Chairman of one of Wilbur Ross' companies, his advocacy of principal forgiveness for mortgage loans wasn't convenient for his new employer, who happens to own substantial mortgage servicing companies that will benefit from being allowed to charge for implementing these revisions to the mortgages?
Lockhart again danced around the question, claiming to have been in favor of this tactic last year, and assuring the questioner that his and Ross' stances were beyond reproach.
Throughout the interview, Lockhart exhibited a nervous, anxious visage and manner which contradicted his words.
So much for truth about the past, or present, from our regulators. Especially when they are in that revolving door between their government posts and new, related private sector positions.
Volcker vs. Dodd Yesterday On Capitol Hill
Volcker was testifying before retiring Senator Dodd's committee on his so-called "Volcker Rule."
After reading a lengthy, clear and comprehensive prepared statement, Volcker entertained questions.
The first one was from the witless Connecticut Senator, himself. Dodd began by presumptuously asking "Paul" to elaborate on how the matter of detecting proprietary trading would be handled. Dodd continued by pontificating on the subject of how difficult this would be, and generally exposed, despite years on the committee, his near-total lack of understanding of modern commercial and investment banking activities.
Volcker responded in an icy tone, fairly dripping with disdain, beginning with a pointedly formal, non-personal "Mr. Chairman."
He then went on to implicitly spank Dodd by casually noting that the answers to Dodd's questions were contained in the text which Volcker had just finished reading.
It was a priceless moment. I think Dodd was probably the only person either in the room or watching via cable coverage who didn't grasp how he'd been humiliated by Volcker in a single sentence.
There's a reason Paul Volcker is iconic, and it was clearly on display yesterday.
Tuesday, February 02, 2010
Gerald Weiss, SVP Corporate Planning & Development, Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., RIP
Gerry was 83 when he passed away last Friday from pneumonia in Cincinnati, Ohio.
When I joined Gerry's Strategic Planning group in 1983, I was one of five VPs in a group that had two other smallish units, comprising no more than perhaps 20 professionals. Gerry had originally been recruited to Chase by David Rockefeller, where he inherited a much larger staff, including a bevy of individuals responsible for business unit strategy development. These latter he rapidly transferred back to their respective businesses, preferring, instead, to run a smaller, more objective and creative group focused on advising the Chairman and CEO on how to manage the bank to increase shareholder value. Few SVPs would willingly give up staff and budget, but Gerry knew what he wanted, and didn't care to be an empire builder.
For the next decade, while larger, more cumbersome and less-focused corporate planning and strategy units vanished from America's large corporations amidst leveraged buyouts, layoffs, restructurings and corporate raids, Gerry maintained his small but influential group of strategists, management scientists and M&A specialists.
Over the next few years, by working closely with Gerry and two of his former GE colleagues, Jack Grossman and Don Heany, I learned that Gerry had reconstituted the vaunted GE Corporate Planning unit, in design and style, of his own mentor, Jack McKittrick. McKittrick, for whom a Google search will return this reference, was the strategic mind behind Fred Borch's management at GE. Gerry explained to me on several occasions how McKittrick, due to his personal wealth, enjoyed an objectivity at GE that few others could have managed. In his own way, Gerry duplicated McKittrick's philosophy, style and aggressive attitude.
Few others at Chase Manhattan realized how much of GE's legendary strategic planning function, attitude and skill had been grafted into Chase with Gerry's arrival.
To those of us fortunate to have worked for and with him, Gerry provided a very rare ability, constantly on display through example, to remain objective and honest on matters of corporate strategy, amidst heavy pressure to simply go along with what was either popular or desired by the Chairman or CEO.
To wit, when I informed a close friend, contemporary and one-time colleague in Gerry's shop over 20 years ago, he replied,
"I will always fondly remember Gerry as the smartest corporate strategy guy I ever came across and as one who had the confidence and principles to say no even when his bosses wanted to hear yes (Ohio thrift acquisitions for instance). He set a great example for all of us."
I can't really express that aspect of Gerry better than my friend and his onetime staffer did.
Another former Chase Manhattan colleague, with whom I spoke on Sunday about Gerry's passing, mused,
'You just never imagine some with Gerry's brilliance and intellect ever not being there anymore.'
During the era in which Chase Manhattan foolishly rushed into acquisitions of failed S&Ls in Ohio, Maryland and Florida, and unwisely overpaid in a bidding war for a real estate development financier, masquerading as a bank, in Arizona, Gerry steadfastly warned against such expensive squandering of bank capital. Only a few years later, one of the expansion's staff, a friend of mine, calculated the deadweight loss of capital invested and losses incurred in the various purchases throughout these states at a then-staggering amount nearing $100MM, at a time when that kind of money was material to Chase's bottom line.
Most Chase employees never knew of the creative initiatives developed by Gerry Weiss, which would have vaulted the bank into the forefront of US finance. Among his ideas were a combination with Norwest Bank, then a leading regional power, to allow Chase shareholders the benefits of Norwest's younger, better management team's prowess with our larger bank's asset base and business mix. Others included moving the regulatory charter to the UK, in order to have the freedom to buy or start businesses in areas prohibited in the US.
Yet, at the same time, over a quarter-century ahead of his time, Gerry prophesied catastrophe from a removal of Glass-Steagall. To paraphrase him back in the mid-1980s on the topic,
'All that will happen is the addition of too much underwriting capacity, managed by mediocre commercial bankers, driving down profits for everyone. This will require ever-riskier behavior from all the investment banks, brokers, and commercial banks, leading to bigger systemic losses, as new, poorly-understood, risky asset classes are invented to drive higher profit margins.'
That's exactly what we saw in the last few years, as Wall Street responded to Congressionally-mandated expansion of marginal quality residential finance lending.
Gerry had the unique ability to both pragmatically understand when a project or idea had hit a brick wall, while also retaining a tireless optimism that, eventually, good strategic ideas and common sense would triumph.
He never shirked from giving his blunt, honest opinions to the chairmen he served, David Rockefeller, Bill Butcher, and Tom Labrecque. The first two valued Gerry's objectivity and wisdom, so that they were never so threatened by his candor that they resorted to asking him to leave.
Having worked closely with Gerry and my then-partner in Corporate Planning, Debbie Smith, in his latter years with Chase, I saw how the bank began to lose momentum and languish, as the CEO ignored Gerry's recommendations on resource allocation and prioritization among businesses, to regain growth and improve income.
The unfortunate result of ignoring Gerry's advice came home to roost after Gerry's retirement, when mutual fund manager Michael Price forced then-Chairman Labrecque to seek a merger with Chemical bank.
Even in so-called retirement, Gerry Weiss had influence well beyond what would normally be expected of a Chief Planning Officer. He continued to guide the Boston-based Strategic Planning Institute, a long-ago spinoff of GE's own planning group from the 1960s.
When Chase EVP Marshall Carter was recruited by competitor State Street Bank to become its next CEO, Carter, upon arrival, retained Gerry as his personal strategy consultant. That relationship continued for roughly a decade, until Carter's own retirement from the well-regarded trust bank.
During the years after Gerry's formal retirement from Chase Manhattan, I saw measures of his continuing influence and the high regard in which well-known business leaders held him. Gerry introduced my own corporate performance work to Carter, whom I also knew from Chase, at State Street Bank.
When Gerry found some related work on productivity and economics which I had developed to be of interest, he contacted David Rockefeller. Within a few months, we had a meeting with the former Chase Manhattan chairman discussing my work.
Similarly, my evolving work on corporate performance, productivity and resource allocation found its way to a meeting between Gerry, Jack Welch, then CEO of GE, and me.
It only took a letter from Gerry to these business leaders suggesting they take a look at some interesting new business research, for their actions to indicate the credibility they attached to Gerry's opinions.
Throughout my own career, I have never worked for, nor even met, any senior executive who was as intelligent, curious, and secure, as Gerry Weiss. At his own formal Chase Manhattan Bank retirement dinner, he explained his longevity, influence and success as resulting from hiring the best people he could find, then facilitating their efforts, not trying to take credit for their work.
People on Gerry's staff routinely presented to and worked closely with the bank's chairman, CEO, and Vice-Chairmen. Thanks to him, a fortunate group of younger managers gained valuable insights into, experience with, and real understanding of the often messy, inefficient and highly political nature of actual business management and decision-making at senior levels in a modern US corporation.
As I reflect on my relationship with Gerry Weiss over more than 25 years, one anecdote remains with me which I believe depicts his unique mix of talent and style.
My partner, Deb Smith, and I had labored on several drafts of a key presentation that we would be giving to Chase's then-chairman, Bill Butcher. By then, both Debbie and I were in our 30s, and had had years of of working for senior managers who would micro-manage such presentations, then take them to a more senior executive for presentation.
Gerry was different. Sessions spent working on a presentation like this one were highly interactive, with Gerry taking on a role as equal team member, not our boss. Ideas bounced back and forth, with a lot of laughter and sarcastic remarks about the managers and culture through which we typically had to work to effect results.
On a Monday morning, after several iterations of the presentation, he assembled the heavily-marked up pages, stacked them together, and looked at us.
'Well, I think you've done all you two can. I know how I want to tweak some of the points, and there's no point wasting your time making you try to read my mind.'
Where most executives would have had us doing another two or three iterations to precisely machine the presentation to his requirements, Gerry retired to his old IBM Selectric typewriter for the morning. Between his edits and his secretary's finishing touches, he produced the final presentation. Which Deb and I gave, while Gerry observed, largely silently.
Nobody else for whom I ever worked, before or since, possessed such intellectual security and confidence. Nor was so effective.
As my one-time colleague noted in his email, Gerry set a great example for those of us fortunate enough to have worked for and with him.
Monday, February 01, 2010
Yet Another Excuse From Geithner For AIG's Rough Treatment
First, we were told it was to prevent a systemic meltdown of the US financial sector due to swaps failing to settle.
Then, it was explained that all counterparties had to be treated equally, and some French executives would be imprisoned if forced to accept less than a 100% payout on their swaps. So Geithner blinked and agreed to the full payments.
Somewhere in the confusion since last fall, Geithner suggested that AIG was "too big to fail."
Now, the Journal reports Geithner's latest excuse. He was concerned about AIG's credit rating!
The Treasury Secretary testified that the state-supervised insurance businesses of AIG were, in fact, subject to failure from the effects of the financial products unit's swaps troubles. Further, Geithner said,
"the people responsible" for AIG's insurance unit regulation "had no idea" of the risks the company was facing.
The Journal editorial correctly notes that this is essentially the complete opposite of what state regulators, including Eric Dinallo, former NY state insurance regulator, believed. And that it's a very different story to explain the AIG swap payments as necessary to maintain AIG's credit rating, for the benefit of its many insurance businesses.
This latest excuse rings false. As the editorial observes, when the US government owns 80% of you, nobody will worry about your credit lines.
The real concern arising from Geithner's ever-shifting reasons for the AIG full swaps payments is that each one portends different problems in the US financial services sector, different regulatory issues and potential solutions.
If Geithner can't keep his excuses straight, how can Congress possibly author a responsible, effective reform of regulation for the sector?
It's neither an academic question, nor a funny one. This is serious. We can't even learn what the primary actors in the sad story of AIG's takeover truly thought was the major risk, and why.
The editorial points out the very major question Geithner's latest excuse implies. That is, is our entire state-based regulatory approach to insurance flawed? Or is Geithner simply grasping at excuses in order to evade responsibility for a bone-headed, expensive, unnecessary and ill-advised action?
How can there be productive forward movement for the financial sector from the recent financial crisis if we can't even pin down simple things, like why the Fed behaved toward and with AIG as it did?
Friday, January 29, 2010
Bernanke's Renomination As Fed Chair
Especially when you consider that he's had the job for one term. I guess some Senators felt that changing Fed chairmen was risking someone even worse than Bernanke.
For a guy who seemed so experienced and well-qualified for the job, he sure made a hash of it when the going got tough.
To me, the salient criticism of Bernanke & Co. was conveyed in Anna Kagan Schwartz' interview in the Wall Street Journal in October, 2008. In that interview, she said this, which is in that linked post,
"But perhaps this is actually Mr. Bernanke's biggest problem. Today's crisis isn't a replay of the problem in the 1930s, but our central bankers have responded by using the tools they should have used then. They are fighting the last war. The result, she argues, has been failure. "I don't see that they've achieved what they should have been trying to achieve. So my verdict on this present Fed leadership is that they have not really done their job."
By that, which she specified elsewhere in the interview, she meant that liquidity wasn't the problem in 2008, but counterparty risk and solvency.
For this alone, I think Bernanke should have been denied another shot at mismanaging our money supply.
I suppose many feel better that even more uncertainty hasn't been injected into the financial system. But the price is to labor under a Fed chief who clearly does not have the confidence of most of Congress, has taken steps that are pretty clearly unconstitutional, including his role in the AIG and Merrill Lynch situations, and confused the nature of the single greatest challenge any Fed chairman has faced, with the probable exceptions of Volcker and Eccles.
Indra Nooyi's Insights On US Consumer Behavior In The Recession
Yesterday morning, PepsiCo CEO Indra Nooyi provided her own very unique perspectives on current consumer behavior and whether the US remains in a recession.
Nooyi began by stating that Pepsi views unemployment statistics differently than most observers, carving up the statistics by type of worker. I only caught two of the categories, which were, not surprisingly, white collar and blue collar workers.
Nooyi discussed visits by blue-collar workers to convenience stores and ATMs. They are visiting less, buying less, withdrawing less cash from ATMs. That was very surprising, as these consumers pay fees for each withdrawal, yet still minimize the amount withdrawn at each ATM visit.Many of these people, she contended, are now unemployed. Thus the fewer trips to the C-stores and less cash withdrawn.
She left no doubts that a large segment of Pepsi consumers have been hit hard by unemployment, and has not yet rebounded.
Separately, Ms. Nooyi left the impression of being a very savvy, insightful and connected CEO. In a product/market of so many consumers, where there are probably fewer identifiable key, large direct customers, Nooyi's team seems to do a great job of continuing to take the pulse of their markets.
Thursday, January 28, 2010
Larry Ellison Changes Course
In fact, Oracle has been on my equity strategy's selection list four times in the past year. That's a testament to Ellison's ability to keep Oracle consistently growing revenues at high rates while still outperforming the S&P on total return.The Continuing Blindness In the AIG Matter
Jenkins engaged in some very humorous role play, contending that Geithner didn't really have much leverage over Goldman et. al. He articulated two options: total nuclear annihilation via an AIG-triggered systemic meltdown, or; explicit exchange of political favors for accepting a haircut on AIG positions.
After discussing the two options, Jenkins offered that a simple government guarantee of AIG's positions would have restored order to the market, probably without costing anything. Certainly less than a complete takeover and payouts to counterparties.
I think Jenkins' idea is sound, but he omitted one very credible alternative that Geithner & Co. have never discussed.
That is, a simple carving out of AIG's financial products unit for placement into bankruptcy. Such a move would have isolated the troubled portion of the insurer from the heavily-regulated insurance operations.
Once in bankruptcy, AIG's counterparties would no longer have a right to 100% payments for positions. But an orderly disposition could have occurred, again avoiding needless losses to US taxpayers.
It continues to mystify me why only one Journal contributor has ever raised this option. It's the default path for failing companies, and should have been the preferred option for AIG.
Geithner may or may not have been guilty of various malfeasances or neglectful inactions in the AIG situation. But one thing is sure. He and his team were surely guilty of a lack of creativity and perspective on the situation.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Apple Joins The eReader Business
For example, Barnes & Noble debuted a reader, as has Sony. Now Apple brings its prowess to the category.
to conclude that Amazon now behaves in a quasi-technology issue manner.Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Bernanke's Troubling Congressional Roadshow
According to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, Helicopter Ben promised he'd continue his easy money policy as a quid pro quo for being reappointed to his current job.
As retiring Kentucky Republican Senator Jim Bunning contended this morning on CNBC, Bernanke is engaging in unusual and dangerous behavior.
What are we to make of a Fed chairman publicly prostrating himself for Senate confirmation votes? Where's the outrage from the rest of the Fed now? They certainly rallied to protest the House bill to audit the Fed. They were all up in arms about the sacred independence of the Fed.
How can it possibly remain 'independent' when its chairman grovels before Congress, promising easier monetary policy than the already-zero interest rates?
Worse, what signal does this send to the rest of the investing world? The chairman of the central bank for the world's reserve currency pleading with those who would reappoint him that he'll make monetary policy sufficiently lax to please them?
This way would seem to lie serious danger for the US dollar and very dire long term economic consequences for our country.
Ed Whitacre Anoints Himself GM CEO
On this basis,
"I like the people, I made some management changes and I just felt comfortable with the team,"
Whitacre decided he will be GM's long term CEO. Never mind the board- it's been a useless rubber stamp for decades. Whitacre was appointed by the current administration, so any notionally publicly-held company would be asking for a fight with the thugs in Washington if they were to contest the federal government's wishes.
After all, consider AIG's fate.
So Whitacre crowned himself king of GM.
Unfortunately, Whitacre's experience has been in a sector more or less defined by government intervention- telecommunications. Sure, he cobbled together SBC, now named ATT, from the remnants of various Bell System operating companies and, finally, the remains of the one-time parent company. But as I noted in an earlier post, the most important task in that sector was managing the regulatory environment, and perhaps cost-cutting.
GM needs an entirely different set of skills in its CEO. To sanction Whitacre's self-promotion to CEO is to admit that GM will continue to be a ward of the US taxpayer. The new CEO's most prominent management changes were to bring in two old regulatory affairs specialists who worked for him at SBC.
Does that tell you something? It ought to.
Whitacre sees GM's most important task as managing Washington. Beyond that, I don't think Ed Whitacre has any idea how to run a competitive company, the business of which is to sell big ticket products to consumers.
Anybody stupid enough to still be a voluntary GM shareholder deserves what happens next.
Oh, right. That would be mostly union members, wouldn't it?
Monday, January 25, 2010
Excerpt from Scott Paterson's New Book "The Quants"
Based on the lengthy piece in the Journal, this is one book that promises to be worth reading.
The review provides a synopsis of some of Paterson's reporting results, primarily from the viewpoint of a secretive quantitative proprietary hedge fund known as the Process Driven Trading group, within Morgan Stanley.
Describing the group, Paterson writes,
"Instead of looking at individual companies and their performance, management and competitors, they use math formulas to make bets on which stocks were going up or down. By the early 2000s, such tech-savvy investors had come to dominate Wall Street, helped by theoretical breakthroughs in the application of mathematics to financial markets, advances that had earned their discoverers several shelves of Nobel Prizes."
Sound familiar?
It should. Paterson's description of Morgan Stanley's PDT group is almost identical to the image and composition of another infamous hedge fund, John Meriwether's Long Term Capital Management. That group, which was largely composed of an exodus of talent from then-independent Salomon Brothers, plus a helping of Nobel Laureates, including Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, attempted to exploit the same sorts of arbitrage opportunities in global securities markets.
LTCM didn't pan out as expected, shutting its doors in bankruptcy after only six years. And causing concern that its failure would bring down global capital markets.
What Paterson's teasing sample reveals is that, well, there really is nothing much new in financial markets.
Back in 1987, the then-experts in trading and risk management were convinced "portfolio insurance" strategies would avoid catastrophic losses. They didn't. Instead, identically-designed risk management systems all dumped the same types of securities amidst a sudden downdraft of equity prices, causing a torrential selloff.
Then again, in 1998, LTCM triggered the same phenomenon. Of course, that time, the underlying hedges were much, much more sophisticated than those of 1987. Back then, the big fad was lightning-fast trading of baskets of S&P components to exploit minute, fleeting price differentials.
By 1998, with tremendous advances in computing power and speed of data communications, LTCM's traders were able to construct far more elaborate, incomprehensible hedges which unwound in almost completely-opaque fashion. Opaque even to their designers.
Now, thanks to Paterson's brief excerpt in Saturday's Journal, we see that the quants were at it again. It's always the same. Bright young 20+ and 30+ year olds who've never seen a market meltdown apply the latest mathematical and physics advances to series of securities market data.
They may have read the fundamental papers on portfolio theory from the 1950s, but probably not. They may be familiar with the pesky, annoying details of minimum assumptions underlying the existence and behavior of liquid securities markets, but probably not.
What they are familiar with is how to take many series of data and extract measures of variance and covariance. Nevermind that what they 'discover' are temporal relationships of abstruse complexity underpinned by then-existing market environments.
To the latest generation of quant trading jockeys, it's all a straightforward application of math to securities markets prices.
The field you never see plumbed nor represented on the hot Wall Street hedge fund trading desks is..... catastrophe theory. The body of work exploring what happens when there are profoundly discontinuous changes in environments which cause rapid and extreme dislocations in outcomes of some system.
From my own background in statistics, I can assure you that the sorts of statistical methods most commonly applied by quants tend to require assumptions of continuity in pricing inputs and behaviors.
Precisely the conditions which send prices moving discontinuously are what tend to be unquantifiable. Especially when those conditions are triggered and amplified by a few dozen hedge funds operating similarly-based quant trading systems.
I've written about this before in posts under the 'Risk Management' label.
What happened in 2007-08 was, it appears, nothing more than the latest version of the application of the most current mathematical methods to series of securities prices which are, in reality, not naturally-occurring forces of nature, but the varying outcomes of human behaviors.
It's telling that, at the end of Paterson's excerpt, Peter Muller, head of PDT, has only two options: hold or fold/sell. He opts to sell.
That's another common element of quant strategies. They assume plentiful capital, or some sort of calm, VAR-based orderly loss of position values which allows a methodical unwinding of desk positions. But that's not what happens in a market meltdown.
Instead, position values melt away and erode capital, triggering risk alarms, margin calls and the need to sell positions in order to conform to capital requirements.
Ah, those pesky day-to-day operating assumptions and details.
If only....if only.....
By now, anyone my age or older, or even a decade younger, should understand that simply because hedge funds are run by people with names like Cliff Asness or Peter Muller, or John Meriweither, with pedigrees from Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley or Salomon Brothers, hardly means they will survive the test of a market collapse.
Sure, they'll no doubt do very well in a reasonably calm, or even frothy upward-moving market. Or a prolonged, gradual market decline.
But the sort of market conditions which are the specialty of Nassim Taleb, the market composed of sudden shear forces, seems to cripple these quant hedging strategies every time. Every decade, in fact.
No, there really doesn't seem to be much new in financial markets when it comes to advanced risk management, complex hedging strategies and quant models. They work really well- until they don't. Then they fail spectacularly, in concert, and turn ordinary market downturns into market panics.
Sunday, January 24, 2010
Regarding Bernanke's Reappointment
I have, on my desk, a Wall Street Journal editorial from the weekend edition of 9-10 January by Judy Shelton. In it, she lampoons the Fed chairman for admitting in a recent speech only,
"the timing of the housing bubble does not rule out some contribution from monetary policy."
Apparently Bernanke still won't face up to the fact that government forces were responsible for the first steps leading to the recent financial sector turmoil. First Greenspan kept interest rates too low for too long. Coupled with that, Congress, through the CRA and misguided direction to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, encouraged, as well as demanded, that mortgage loans be made to unqualified home buyers.
Yes, with that stage set, commercial, investment and mortgage banks were too aggressive in their pursuit of profits through residential home financing. But they simply joined the party that the Fed and Congress had started.
Now that the voting public is angry at the federal government for having rescued banks which should have been allowed to fail, Bernanke's reappointment carries more risk than it did only a few months ago.
Personally, I believe that Bernanke responded incorrectly to the developing financial sector debacle as far back as the late summer of 2007. With post-1929 securities markets and banking reforms in place, including deposit insurance, bank insolvency is no longer something to be papered over. Furthermore, there was little sign that monetary liquidity had ever truly dried up in 2007 or 2008.
What worried federal officials was the solvency of Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, not the overall liquidity in the US.
Additionally, at a time of administration and Congressional overreach in several legislative areas, the Fed is now seen as having behaved in an unconstitutional manner in the AIG case. And its rush, with Treasury, to force-feed federal funding to large banks which could have safely been put into receivership to thin out the sector's overcapacity, is now seen as favoring large business and financial interests at the literal expense of taxpayers.
This has suddenly become very unpopular. Especially in the wake of the election to the US Senate of Republican Scott Brown last Tuesday.
For once, I'm with Larry Kudlow, of CNBC, in thinking that John Taylor would be a good replacement for helicopter Ben. Rather than avoid a depression, our recent challenges have been how to productively and effectively shed excess financial sector capacity without having monetary policy become either overly restrictive, or overly stimulative.
I personally think Bernanke is damaged goods now. He pulled the wrong levers during the recent financial crisis, helped things spin out of control, only to have to apply too much force to rein them back in, while apparently engaging in some illegal behavior by coercing BankofAmerica to close its purchase of Merrill Lynch.
Regardless of its effect on the equity markets, I am actually pleased to see that Bernanke's reconfirmation for Fed chairman is now a long shot.