There was a terrific article in the Wall Street Journal the other day describing Chevron's work on the recovery of heavy oil in Saudi Arabia.
What I found reassuring about the piece is that it reinforces my faith in human behavior and economics, which studies that behavior in the area of value exchange.
Basically, as light-oil reserves are drawn down, and crude oil prices rise, the incentive to recover deposits of heavy oil has risen. Chevron is working to recover the substantial Saudi reserves of this molasses-like material. According to the piece, including heavy oil reserves to the Saudi offical reserves would add "tens of billions of barrels" to their current 260 billion barrel estimate.
Buried in the article was a passing reference to the "peak oil" theory. According to the WSJ piece, adding recoverable heavy-oil reserves to the world's oil supply would put a major dent in the theory that we are on the brink of pumping ever-declining amounts of crude each year. This would appear to be no small thing. With India and China bidding up the price of existing supplies of crude in the past year, the prospect of declining crude supply would be a potentially civilization-altering phenomenon.
It's nice to see economic theory still describes how humans react to shortages. As crude prices have more than tripled since 2002, alternatives such as gassified coal, liquified natural gas, tar sands, and, now, heavy-oil are coming onstream to compete with the higher-priced light crude supplies.
Even at $3/gallon, gasoline is cheaper on a real basis now, in the US, than it was at the height of the Arab oil embargo of the mid-1970s. It remains to be seen if these admittedly-higher gasoline, and related, energy prices cause a global recession, but it is by no means at all certain. Recent estimates by economists put the chances at perhaps as high as 36%, up from 17% six months ago. When I read that, I thought it made sense. With higher energy prices and mideast violence, there is a natural concern that energy security issues will contribute to higher prices, and, thus, economic slowdown.
However, as recently as yesterday, Fed Chairman Bernanke reiterated Greenspan's comments of last year, that the US economy has displayed amazing resilience in the face of higher energy costs.
With the price signals of higher energy costs, new supplies are predictably coming onstream. Julian Simons would be so pleased to see his beliefs once again sustained. When these various alternative energy sources provide supply to the market, we should expect to have a near-term ceiling on energy prices and more supply for some time to come.
Crisis identified. Crisis resolved. Free-market style.
Like other resource supply issues of the past, such as silk (nylon, et al), rubber (synthetic rubber in WWII), and steel (minimills), energy, too, will fall to human ingenuity and the desire of people to make a buck solving economic problems.
Thursday, July 20, 2006
Tuesday, July 18, 2006
Home Depot Revisited: Before Nardelli
Yesterday, I compared the recent performances of Lowes and Home Depot, in an attempt to understand the accolades given Bob Nardelli for allegedly "turning around" the fundamentals at the latter company since his arrival in late 2000.In that piece, I found, using the data in the table above, from Compustat, that Nardelli does not seem to have outperformed his main competitor over the last 5 years. Home Depot's sales growth rate is not so impressive and is inconsistent as well. From my proprietary research, I would conclude that these operating characteristics alone account for Home Depot's dismal total returns since Nardelli's taking the CEO position. NIAT performance isn't much better, confirming the low regard in which investors seem to hold the company now.
It wasn't always thus. Back in July, 1999, I held Home Depot in my equity portfolio. It's performance was so strong and consistent, among that of the S&P500 field, that it was selected for inclusion, among other consistently superior companies. It subsequently returned roughly 60% from July to December, 1999.
As the table at the left shows, the Home Depot of that era was a much differently performing company. Note the much higher growth rates for sales and NIAT. The green backgrounded column provides the simple averages for sales and NIAT growth, and total returns, for mid-1993 to mid-1999. The yellow highlighted cells indicate the minimum value for the measure during the period shown. Clicking on the table will bring up an enlarged view.Comparing these values to the ones describing Home Depot recently, one can see why the firm was much more highly valued seven years ago. It was a consistently superior, growing large-cap firm.
It's total returns were correspondingly above-average. This type of performance of a large-cap company should earn the CEO extraordinary compensation. By contrast, Nardelli's 5 year record justifies nothing even close to a compensation package suggesting he has brought success to Home Depot.
Whether Home Depot's performance was bound to decline, due to time and probabilities, is arguable. But, if it were, even more reason not to overcompensate the next CEO for failing to offset those odds. However, what is curious to me is that Home Depot hasn't underperformed on total return because investors learned to expect excellent fundamental performance from the firm. Rather, its fundamental performance simply fell apart. And that has nothing to do with "uncontrollable market forces." Those are the types of problems CEOs are well-paid to fix. And Nardelli has not done that during his five years leading Home Depot.
Monday, July 17, 2006
Lowes vs. Home Depot: Nardelli's Performance
There has been considerable discussion of Bob Nardelli's performance and personal behavior during his stint as CEO of Home Depot. Nardelli arrived at HD in late 2000, fresh from GE, where he was also known as, I learned recently, "little Jack." I'm not sure one can say it was affectionately, unless perhaps by Welch.
While discussing the Nardelli/Home Depot flap with my partner yesterday morning, I contended that the reason for Home Depot's lackluster total returns under Nardelli are probably accounted for by the pattern of sales growth during his reign. My partner asked me to compare Lowes and Home Depot to see if my contention is correct. During the recent flare up of criticism over Nardelli's handling of Home Depot's annual meeting, several people commented that Nardelli has turned the company around, in terms of fundamental operating performance. He is apparently pitied for doing the right operating things, but getting "no credit" from the market, in the form of total returns for his shareholders. I wanted to see if this is, in fact, true, as did my partner.
In order to evaluate these comments, I first looked at a Yahoo chart of Lowes and Home Depot's stock prices over the past 5 years. As I mentioned in a prior post, Lowes has clearly outperformed over this recent period.
This is in stark contrast to the longer term performance of the two companies' stock prices. The Yahoo price chart at the left, going back to 1985, shows a much different picture.
Here, we see that Home Depot was on a tear, until ....oops...2000. Just before Nardelli took over, the company hit a flat spot, from which it has yet to recover. In fact, it's stock price has actually declined since Nardelli took the helm.
Lowes, on the other hand, has had a rather constant, although slower, stock price rise over the last 21 years. It was a little flat in the late '80s, then began a reasonably monotonic rise in stock price that continued until very recently.
Over the entire period, Home Depot was the better investment, and both Lowes and Home Depot outperformed the S&P500 Index. But, these views don't include dividends, in case they make a significant difference, nor fundamental data, such as sales or profit growth.
For that view, I went to my Compustat data and retrieved the total returns, sales and NIAT data for Lowes and Home Depot from July, 1999, to June, 2006. The table at the left displays the performances for the two companies on these fundamental and technical dimensions. You may click on it to see the enlarged view.
The top two rows display the annual nominal sales growth of the two companies since 2000. Leaving out 2000, in order to only measure the Nardelli years, we see that Lowes has an average annual sales growth of 13% during the period. This is 1.42x that of Home Depot's average annual sales growth of 9%. That seems to be to be a good reason why Lowes has done better for its shareholders lately. But look at the worst sales growth years for each firm. Lowes never dropped below 10%, while Home Depot had two years in which its sales growth was 3% and an 8%. And these were after 2002, well into the Nardelli era.
If Bob Nardelli has turned Home Depot around, we haven't seen it in the sales growth numbers.
Looking at NIAT (net income after tax), we see a similar pattern. Lowes' average annual NIAT growth is 1.66x that of Home Depot, or 18% vs. 11%. Again, Lowes' worst year featured an 8% growth rate, while Home Depot's was -1%. A decline. Not good for investor confidence.
Here, again, we see no evidence of the 'Nardelli operating turnaround' at Home Depot. I have to confess, I just don't see what Welch, Maria Bartiromo, and others are squawking about. Nardelli's company has lousy stock price performance because its operating performance is uneven and below that of its major competitor.
But, just to be thorough, let's take a look at the actual annual total returns since 2001. That is the third set of paired rows of data in the table. Home Depot's simple average annual return for the period is -4%. Lowes earned an average annual total return of 23% for the same period. Neither company has had a very consistent total return. Which would be at least one reason why neither would be among my equity portfolio selections for the past few years.
However, it seems pretty clear to me that, since 2001, Lowes has exhibited higher and more consistent sales and income growth than has Home Depot. The data doesn't seem to support a "turnaround" by Nardelli, unless his company was doing even worse before he got there. But the stock price data suggest that isn't true.
When you look at the data, Nardelli hasn't performed well for his shareholders on fundamental operating measures like sales and income growth. Is it really surprising the stock price is down, and the company's total returns have trailed both its major competitor, Lowes, and the S&P?
While discussing the Nardelli/Home Depot flap with my partner yesterday morning, I contended that the reason for Home Depot's lackluster total returns under Nardelli are probably accounted for by the pattern of sales growth during his reign. My partner asked me to compare Lowes and Home Depot to see if my contention is correct. During the recent flare up of criticism over Nardelli's handling of Home Depot's annual meeting, several people commented that Nardelli has turned the company around, in terms of fundamental operating performance. He is apparently pitied for doing the right operating things, but getting "no credit" from the market, in the form of total returns for his shareholders. I wanted to see if this is, in fact, true, as did my partner.
In order to evaluate these comments, I first looked at a Yahoo chart of Lowes and Home Depot's stock prices over the past 5 years. As I mentioned in a prior post, Lowes has clearly outperformed over this recent period.
This is in stark contrast to the longer term performance of the two companies' stock prices. The Yahoo price chart at the left, going back to 1985, shows a much different picture.Here, we see that Home Depot was on a tear, until ....oops...2000. Just before Nardelli took over, the company hit a flat spot, from which it has yet to recover. In fact, it's stock price has actually declined since Nardelli took the helm.
Lowes, on the other hand, has had a rather constant, although slower, stock price rise over the last 21 years. It was a little flat in the late '80s, then began a reasonably monotonic rise in stock price that continued until very recently.
Over the entire period, Home Depot was the better investment, and both Lowes and Home Depot outperformed the S&P500 Index. But, these views don't include dividends, in case they make a significant difference, nor fundamental data, such as sales or profit growth.
For that view, I went to my Compustat data and retrieved the total returns, sales and NIAT data for Lowes and Home Depot from July, 1999, to June, 2006. The table at the left displays the performances for the two companies on these fundamental and technical dimensions. You may click on it to see the enlarged view.The top two rows display the annual nominal sales growth of the two companies since 2000. Leaving out 2000, in order to only measure the Nardelli years, we see that Lowes has an average annual sales growth of 13% during the period. This is 1.42x that of Home Depot's average annual sales growth of 9%. That seems to be to be a good reason why Lowes has done better for its shareholders lately. But look at the worst sales growth years for each firm. Lowes never dropped below 10%, while Home Depot had two years in which its sales growth was 3% and an 8%. And these were after 2002, well into the Nardelli era.
If Bob Nardelli has turned Home Depot around, we haven't seen it in the sales growth numbers.
Looking at NIAT (net income after tax), we see a similar pattern. Lowes' average annual NIAT growth is 1.66x that of Home Depot, or 18% vs. 11%. Again, Lowes' worst year featured an 8% growth rate, while Home Depot's was -1%. A decline. Not good for investor confidence.
Here, again, we see no evidence of the 'Nardelli operating turnaround' at Home Depot. I have to confess, I just don't see what Welch, Maria Bartiromo, and others are squawking about. Nardelli's company has lousy stock price performance because its operating performance is uneven and below that of its major competitor.
But, just to be thorough, let's take a look at the actual annual total returns since 2001. That is the third set of paired rows of data in the table. Home Depot's simple average annual return for the period is -4%. Lowes earned an average annual total return of 23% for the same period. Neither company has had a very consistent total return. Which would be at least one reason why neither would be among my equity portfolio selections for the past few years.
However, it seems pretty clear to me that, since 2001, Lowes has exhibited higher and more consistent sales and income growth than has Home Depot. The data doesn't seem to support a "turnaround" by Nardelli, unless his company was doing even worse before he got there. But the stock price data suggest that isn't true.
When you look at the data, Nardelli hasn't performed well for his shareholders on fundamental operating measures like sales and income growth. Is it really surprising the stock price is down, and the company's total returns have trailed both its major competitor, Lowes, and the S&P?
Friday, July 14, 2006
Carlos Goshn Speaks Out On CNBC
Carlos Goshn, CEO of Nissan and Renault, appeared yesterday in an interview on CNBC with that network's talking head, Maria Bartiromo. His visit was no doubt a coup for the network, as Goshn is now the most sought-after executive in all of the automotive sector.
Kirk Kerkorian, GM's largest, and predatory, shareholder, is desperately trying to find a way that Mr. Goshn can, effectively, run GM. To that end, Kerkorian and his associate, now GM board member, Jerry York, have proposed that GM enter an alliance with Nissan/Renault, thus hopefully securing Goshn's services on GM's behalf.
Judging from Goshn's statements in the interview, Kerkorian had better start praying that something else comes along to help GM and its stock price. Because Carlos Goshn made it crystal clear that he had no spare time for GM. However, most interesting were his remarks on what an alliance does for the parties involved.
Goshn explained that while such an alliance might help GM with shared parts, engines, perhaps platforms and designs, each alliance member is responsible for fixing their own company's problems.
Thus, Goshn ruled out being the white knight to come riding in, replace Rick Wagoner, and rescue GM. At best, he left the door open for GM to join the Nissan/Renault alliance, swap equity stakes, and help itself with access to knowledge from the other two members.
I'd say this puts another nail in GM's coffin for the long term. While Rick Wagoner may not be out of a job because of this proposed alliance, he may well be out of a job due to continued unsolved problems and lackluster performance at GM.
Goshn came off as a very resolute, no-nonsense, pragmatic and realistic executive. Pretty much the opposite of Wagoner. I can see why Goshn solved Nissan's problems. And from some of his remarks, I think, were he to actually assume the title of GM CEO, he'd "rescue" GM by carving out a much-reduced core company of decent products and cost structures, while summarily shedding much of the giant's outmoded asset and personnel bases.
It should be very interesting to watch Kerkorian's moves during the rest of the summer, as the alliance discussions and subsequent maneuvers pan out. But, suffice to say, I wouldn't go buy GM stock based upon what I heard from Goshn yesterday.
Kirk Kerkorian, GM's largest, and predatory, shareholder, is desperately trying to find a way that Mr. Goshn can, effectively, run GM. To that end, Kerkorian and his associate, now GM board member, Jerry York, have proposed that GM enter an alliance with Nissan/Renault, thus hopefully securing Goshn's services on GM's behalf.
Judging from Goshn's statements in the interview, Kerkorian had better start praying that something else comes along to help GM and its stock price. Because Carlos Goshn made it crystal clear that he had no spare time for GM. However, most interesting were his remarks on what an alliance does for the parties involved.
Goshn explained that while such an alliance might help GM with shared parts, engines, perhaps platforms and designs, each alliance member is responsible for fixing their own company's problems.
Thus, Goshn ruled out being the white knight to come riding in, replace Rick Wagoner, and rescue GM. At best, he left the door open for GM to join the Nissan/Renault alliance, swap equity stakes, and help itself with access to knowledge from the other two members.
I'd say this puts another nail in GM's coffin for the long term. While Rick Wagoner may not be out of a job because of this proposed alliance, he may well be out of a job due to continued unsolved problems and lackluster performance at GM.
Goshn came off as a very resolute, no-nonsense, pragmatic and realistic executive. Pretty much the opposite of Wagoner. I can see why Goshn solved Nissan's problems. And from some of his remarks, I think, were he to actually assume the title of GM CEO, he'd "rescue" GM by carving out a much-reduced core company of decent products and cost structures, while summarily shedding much of the giant's outmoded asset and personnel bases.
It should be very interesting to watch Kerkorian's moves during the rest of the summer, as the alliance discussions and subsequent maneuvers pan out. But, suffice to say, I wouldn't go buy GM stock based upon what I heard from Goshn yesterday.
Thursday, July 13, 2006
Free Media Publishing Leaps Into Video
Bill Gates Praising the Mac
Here's a little example of why Time Warner and other "old" media conglomerates are in trouble. It's a video clip of a much younger (than now) Bill Gates at an Apple developers conference. I found it on YouTube, and linked it to this blog post. Mostly just to demonstrate a point about technological advances in free online publishing.
I wrote a piece about YouTube recently. It's the online video clip site which functions somewhat like ShutterFly or PhotoBucket. My consulting friend S remarked to me the other day that YouTube allows clips to be linked to blogs. In her words, now "everybody is a star." Or soon could be.
She and I have debated the coming integration of online video entertainment and broadcast/cable content. YouTube adds another interesting bit into the mosaic.
Consider what has now happened.
This blog is free to you and me. Google supplies Blogger for free, even without the ads. Dominating more content in a surging product/service space is reasonable strategy, if the basic cost of doing so is buying more servers. I eventually realize something like the price of a cup of coffee for any click-through revenue from the ads on this blogsite.
Now, YouTube seamlessly links its clips to Blogger. Anyone who shoots digital video of interest can post it for free on YouTube. Competition for content has become so stiff already, that YouTube's competitors, such as Revver, are paying people larger slices of ad revenues to post videos on their site.
This morning, the on-air staff of CNBC held a hand-wringing debate over blogs. Apparently, there was a recent incident in which some blogger posted false information about a company, and its stock price suffered.
Aside from the hilarity of an entertainment show like SquawkBox, the show on which the 'debate' aired, treating blogs from a 'news' standpoint, their discussion demonstrates how much reach independent, "free" published media now may have.
Commentary and editorial blogs, such as this one, are unlikely to be running afoul of any laws regarding insider trading. With increasing amounts of online media available on which to comment, and a free base of operations, how much value added can large media conglomerates create anymore, outside of pure entertainment? It seems even they can't make their news operations pay for themselves. And commentary can be published by anyone for free.
Granted, distribution is a challenge. But it's a far cry from a decade ago, when it wasn't even feasible for someone to write a daily "column" without a syndicated deal with a newspaper chain.
If I wanted to, I could "cast" this blog in video, and post it, without cost, on iTunes or YouTube. In the case of YouTube, I can automatically link my video back here to a post. Somebody else's business model is paying for all the transmission bandwidth, disc storage, and server processing to make this happen. In fact, Google's, and other new media firms' business models are all about generating revenues from viewers, not providers. And not even making the viewers pay directly or explicitly, but, rather, through advertising.
Now, where did I see this before? Oh, right. It's the new version of the "old" televsion business model. Except, this time, it's eviscerating broadcast television.
With the arrival of direct viewing of media content on your television, from the internet, cable revenues from "repackaging" content from "channels" and networks will begin to suffer as well.
My, how times have changed. Now, I can read or hear a story, or view a clip, and write about it the same day. Even link, in many cases, to the story or clip. As I did in my recent piece about Jack Welch in Fortune Magazine. Or downloaded this Bill Gates clip from YouTube.
In a world that supports and embraces this sort of inexpensive integration of multi-media, editorializing, and analysis, what does that portend for the media giants of our time- NewsCorp, Time Warner, McGraw-Hill?
Consider what this integration means to the music divisions of media conglomerates, such as Time Warner. Would a new band not now be able to digitally shoot a video of their performance, and post it free to YouTube? Then link the video(s) to their website, and publish the website URL at their concerts? Then go straight to iTunes with the content they record from digital tools on their iMacs, and....voila! Where's the big publishing giant in the middle? Gone.
Suffice to say, I'll be surprised if any of them appear in my portfolio's selections of consistently superior, high-growth companies.
Here's a little example of why Time Warner and other "old" media conglomerates are in trouble. It's a video clip of a much younger (than now) Bill Gates at an Apple developers conference. I found it on YouTube, and linked it to this blog post. Mostly just to demonstrate a point about technological advances in free online publishing.
I wrote a piece about YouTube recently. It's the online video clip site which functions somewhat like ShutterFly or PhotoBucket. My consulting friend S remarked to me the other day that YouTube allows clips to be linked to blogs. In her words, now "everybody is a star." Or soon could be.
She and I have debated the coming integration of online video entertainment and broadcast/cable content. YouTube adds another interesting bit into the mosaic.
Consider what has now happened.
This blog is free to you and me. Google supplies Blogger for free, even without the ads. Dominating more content in a surging product/service space is reasonable strategy, if the basic cost of doing so is buying more servers. I eventually realize something like the price of a cup of coffee for any click-through revenue from the ads on this blogsite.
Now, YouTube seamlessly links its clips to Blogger. Anyone who shoots digital video of interest can post it for free on YouTube. Competition for content has become so stiff already, that YouTube's competitors, such as Revver, are paying people larger slices of ad revenues to post videos on their site.
This morning, the on-air staff of CNBC held a hand-wringing debate over blogs. Apparently, there was a recent incident in which some blogger posted false information about a company, and its stock price suffered.
Aside from the hilarity of an entertainment show like SquawkBox, the show on which the 'debate' aired, treating blogs from a 'news' standpoint, their discussion demonstrates how much reach independent, "free" published media now may have.
Commentary and editorial blogs, such as this one, are unlikely to be running afoul of any laws regarding insider trading. With increasing amounts of online media available on which to comment, and a free base of operations, how much value added can large media conglomerates create anymore, outside of pure entertainment? It seems even they can't make their news operations pay for themselves. And commentary can be published by anyone for free.
Granted, distribution is a challenge. But it's a far cry from a decade ago, when it wasn't even feasible for someone to write a daily "column" without a syndicated deal with a newspaper chain.
If I wanted to, I could "cast" this blog in video, and post it, without cost, on iTunes or YouTube. In the case of YouTube, I can automatically link my video back here to a post. Somebody else's business model is paying for all the transmission bandwidth, disc storage, and server processing to make this happen. In fact, Google's, and other new media firms' business models are all about generating revenues from viewers, not providers. And not even making the viewers pay directly or explicitly, but, rather, through advertising.
Now, where did I see this before? Oh, right. It's the new version of the "old" televsion business model. Except, this time, it's eviscerating broadcast television.
With the arrival of direct viewing of media content on your television, from the internet, cable revenues from "repackaging" content from "channels" and networks will begin to suffer as well.
My, how times have changed. Now, I can read or hear a story, or view a clip, and write about it the same day. Even link, in many cases, to the story or clip. As I did in my recent piece about Jack Welch in Fortune Magazine. Or downloaded this Bill Gates clip from YouTube.
In a world that supports and embraces this sort of inexpensive integration of multi-media, editorializing, and analysis, what does that portend for the media giants of our time- NewsCorp, Time Warner, McGraw-Hill?
Consider what this integration means to the music divisions of media conglomerates, such as Time Warner. Would a new band not now be able to digitally shoot a video of their performance, and post it free to YouTube? Then link the video(s) to their website, and publish the website URL at their concerts? Then go straight to iTunes with the content they record from digital tools on their iMacs, and....voila! Where's the big publishing giant in the middle? Gone.
Suffice to say, I'll be surprised if any of them appear in my portfolio's selections of consistently superior, high-growth companies.
Stop the Presses: Goshn & GM
Yesterday's Wall Street Journal carried a very illuminating piece on Carlos Goshn, Renault, and the potential alliance between Renault, Nissan and GM. This is Kirk Kerkorian's hopeful gambit to exit his considerable position in GM stock at a profit.
What the Journal pointed out, however, is that, while Goshn did turn around Nissan, as he promised, he hasn't yet succeeded with Renault. After 18 months of work, according to the article, Renault is still valued at zero, awaiting Goshn's magic touch. The other pieces of the alliance allegedly comprise the value of the outstanding stock, indicating that investors are awaiting Renault's rehabilitation.
What this means, as the article pointed out, is that GM & Kerkorian may have to wait in line for quite a while for this alliance to develop. Or to show results, if it does develop.
Maybe Rick Wagoner doesn't have much to worry about from Goshn & Co. just yet. And maybe I was premature in suggesting, earlier this week, that my prediction of one less CEO in Detroit is nearing reality faster than I had expected.
Still, it's not good news for GM's shareholders. I think the suggestion of the alliance simply puts GM in the "intensive care" unit for the forseeable future. And as I've written before, I would not look to the prior and current management team to fix what they messed up, on such a large scale, to begin with. My guess is that this new revelation about Goshn's capacity to help GM means the latter will likely be foundering a while longer.
In any case, it highlights a potential pitfall in GM's path out of its misery. And its shareholders are by no means out of the woods yet, by a long shot.
What the Journal pointed out, however, is that, while Goshn did turn around Nissan, as he promised, he hasn't yet succeeded with Renault. After 18 months of work, according to the article, Renault is still valued at zero, awaiting Goshn's magic touch. The other pieces of the alliance allegedly comprise the value of the outstanding stock, indicating that investors are awaiting Renault's rehabilitation.
What this means, as the article pointed out, is that GM & Kerkorian may have to wait in line for quite a while for this alliance to develop. Or to show results, if it does develop.
Maybe Rick Wagoner doesn't have much to worry about from Goshn & Co. just yet. And maybe I was premature in suggesting, earlier this week, that my prediction of one less CEO in Detroit is nearing reality faster than I had expected.
Still, it's not good news for GM's shareholders. I think the suggestion of the alliance simply puts GM in the "intensive care" unit for the forseeable future. And as I've written before, I would not look to the prior and current management team to fix what they messed up, on such a large scale, to begin with. My guess is that this new revelation about Goshn's capacity to help GM means the latter will likely be foundering a while longer.
In any case, it highlights a potential pitfall in GM's path out of its misery. And its shareholders are by no means out of the woods yet, by a long shot.
Wednesday, July 12, 2006
Jack Welch's "Way" Returns to the Spotlight
Today marked the first time in ages that Jack Welch has made an appearance on CNBC.
The occasion was to discuss this article, recently published as the cover story in Fortune magazine. It contends that Jack Welch's "rules" are now out of fashion. That he was a star CEO for the 1990s, but is now passe.
This morning, Welch appeared on CNBC, in a polo shirt, with a lush pastoral scene as a background, from Nantucket. Clearly, Welch chose to rebut the article in the role of retired, wise ex-CEO, rather than suited defender of a track record.
There are several aspects to this topic. One is Fortune's article. The next is Welch's rebuttal. And, finally, there is Welch's actual performance, which is purportedly the basis on which his now controversial views were built.
Betsy Morris' piece is of a mixed nature, in my opinion. While some of her "new rules" are different than Welch's explicit pronouncements, they are not necessarily things with which he would have, or now does, disagree: organizational agility, focus on building niche markets, hiring passionate people, and looking outward from the company.
Morris' "old rules," attributed to Welch, smack of being straw men. I don't personally recall Welch saying any of them verbatim as presented, except for the time honored, still-relevant advice to be #1 or #2 by market share, rather than compete as a distant also-ran. So in this case, Morris probably overstepped herself.
In the main, though, I think her points are well taken. She restated and sharpened them on CNBC this morning, appearing about 20 minutes before Welch did. She essentially noted that Welch and his 'six sigma' preoccupation tended to focus on wringing efficiency from existing businesses. She opined that today, popularly-lauded companies such as Apple and Google rapidly design and release whole new categories of products and services, whereas GE tended to carefully crawl along, grinding out steady earnings increases, rather than torrid product change and revenue growth.
Now, to Welch's reply. He first dismissed the whole matter as directed 'against my wife, Suzy, and me, because we write a weekly column for BusinessWeek, Fortune's competitor.' Then he also dismissed remarks by United Technologies CEO George David, reputed to rebuke Welch, as taken "out of context."
After these qualifiers, Welch essentially lampooned Morris' list of "old rules," and claimed that, in fact, her "new rules" are, in reality, his. And were all along. Welch steadfastly disputed that 'his era' is over, or that his approaches, as CEO, would no longer work, 5 years after his retirement.
A few comments on the matter thus far. Nobody but Jack Welch mentioned his current wife ( #3?) in all of this. Suzy didn't run GE for more than a decade- Jack did. Frankly, I don't really believe anyone else cares what Suzy Welch does or does not think about management.
It's unlikely that Jack Welch would have been against Morris' "new rules," provided that they ground out earnings which fit Welch's GE management style. However, they clearly were not his major foci while leading GE.
My revered mentor, an ex-GE senior planning exec, and Chase SVP of Corporate Planning, used to say, "there are hundreds of business aphorisms, some contradictory. The question at hand is, which are relevant in this situation, for this business."
That's really the nub of the Welch tempest right now. Morris is trying to say, 'Welch never said 'nimble,' so he's against it, and now it's important.' Welch is saying, 'only an idiot would be against a nimble company- I was always for 'nimble.'
Frankly, neither is totally correct. But, on balance, I think Morris is right.
Despite Morris' citing companies which are, themselves, not consistently superior in growing and delivering total returns to shareholders, I believe she is right in applauding the focus on raw revenue growth and market creation which is shared by companies like Apple, Google, or Gilead.
As I have written before, in this blog, size, by itself, is of little value anymore. Witness GM and Ford. IBM and Microsoft. Intel.
As the chart at the top of this post illustrates, even Welch didn't really manage GE to consistently outperform the S&P over his tenure, from 1981 to 2001. He had a few brief periods of radical outperformance, notably his restructuring of the firm upon his accession to the CEO post. For the most part, GE has never been a highly-consistent growth company which has outperformed the index (GE has never made my portfolio's list of consistently superior performing companies among the S&P500 candidates). I pointed this out to Welch, in person, in a meeting in the mid-1990s. He was shocked, and, literally, speechless for a few minutes, as he studied a chart I presented which showed GE's share price against the Dow-Jones since he took over GE. His comment, when he next spoke, was, "nobody's ever shown me this chart before." Suffice to say, the chart demonstrated that Jack had not added all that much comparative value for his shareholders over his tenure to that point.
As I wrote in a prior post, the most value Welch ever created for his shareholders, comparatively, with the market, was his brilliant triage of the sluggish firm he inherited from Reg Jones, amidst the worst inflationary environment of the modern US business era. The Jones era, for GE, was, as the chart above shows, dismal. Welch revitalized a tired company which had lost its focus and direction. However, owning GE didn't reliably provide equity investors with consistently superior growth and return prospects, as holding many other S&P components would have, over the past 20 years.
Among all of Welch's portfolio of businesses, GE Capital was the only really reliably high-growth unit. Upon taking over GE, Immelt was assailed by critics who suddenly had the scales fall from their eyes, and realized how heavily leveraged the unit was. Somehow, Welch managed to sprinkle magic dust over this easily-observed fact, during his tenure as CEO. Immelt suffered for the clever diversion of analysts' attention to predictable quarterly earnings sans consistently superior topline revenue growth for the firm.
So, for me, this whole episode, while entertaining (hey, it's on CNBC- what'd you expect?), is moot. Welch's GE was never one of those rare, consistently superior growth and return companies which are the hallmark, and components, of my investment portfolios. Arguing over "his rules," is, in my opinion, totally beside the point. If he'd run a more impressively-performing company, I'd feel differently.
But Welch didn't, so I don't.
Tuesday, July 11, 2006
Ford's "Way Forward" in Brazil
Yesterday's Wall Street Journal featured an article about Ford's "Way Forward" program successes in Brazil.
I have to say, I was unimpressed with what it portends for the giant auto maker.
To distill the well-written article to its essence, the Brazilian unit of Ford has scored major gains with a new SUV model by doing two things: sensibly restructuring the physical manner in which they produce the car, and doing intensive consumer market research to design a car which the relevant market segment will buy, at a profitable (to Ford) price.
The good news, of course, is that some people at Ford down in Brazil, led by one Luc de Ferran, pulled this off. It's inspirational, and certainly better, as the saying goes, "than a sharp stick in the eye."
However, the bad news is that this "turnaround" at Ford Brazil is nothing fancy. Basically, the unit had fallen on extremely bad times, and simply rediscovered what, I believe, intelligent business people everywhere would acknowledge are obvious maxims.
They redesigned manufacturing to adapt to current realities, thus cutting wasted time and expense. They returned to classic marketing in the design of a new vehicle, using consumer research to uncover wants and needs, the incorporation of which, in the new Ecosport SUV, caused the car to gain an 80% market share.
This anecdote brings me to recall some of my prior posts regarding mediocrity and ineptitude in the general business environment. Specifically, this post about UAL, this one about Starbucks, and this one about Intel v. AMD.
Why is that Ford's Brazilian unit, or, for that matter, Ford itself, globally, must have its back to the wall in order to rediscover basic business sensibilities?
I suspect that the reason boils down to one word- discipline.
In a process which parallels Aristotle's thoughts on the decline of governmental systems from the pinnacle, the 'philosopher-kin' phase, I think corporate leadership/management undergoes something very similar.
When a company is "on top," competitively and in terms of consistently delivering superior total returns for shareholders, a sense of complacency begins to set in. The questioning, innovative behaviors which probably drove the company's success, begin to be institutionalized by a second tier of acolytes as 'revered processes.' The originators of the initial success move on- retirement of the lauded CEO, perhaps a few SVPs move to head other companies. Too, some of the wizards of the successful change are promoted, focus upward, and leave the nuts and bolts continuation of the success to less-capable subordinates. The new generation of leaders begin to do two things: view the changes wrought by the earlier successful managers as 'codes to live by,' missing the fundamental value of the changes having led to success, not the particular endpoint of the organizational, product, etc, changes, and; beginning to introduce some of their own changes.
Truth be told, management teams that drive companies to truly excellent, consistently superior performances, are pretty rare. Whomever comes after them, like Paul Otellini at Intel, faces are daunting, and, essentially, more difficult task.
In time, the company begins to fill with lesser-talented management, its performance coasting to 'good,' from 'consistently superior.' The focus on prior methods and successes makes it hard for a less-talented group to recapture the successes of an early management generation.
If the company is lucky, another group will rise and repeat the earlier fundamental business practices that, once again, restore manufacturing, production, and/or service delivery to more productive levels, while introducing more relevant new products and services.
In short, it seems that, in large companies, there is simply a lack of discipline, over time, of management to value and retain a focus on 'purposeful change' of the company and its practices. It's as if nobody watches the measurements of performance which might signal that it's time for the company to innovate and change once again.
So, in a sense, Ford is no different, I suppose, than the average US company. And that's both a pity, and, I think, my point. The WSJ piece merely confirms that Ford is a normal US large-cap manufacturer that loses its way more often than it finds it.
Trouble is, today, it may have much less time and financial leeway to recover one more time.
I have to say, I was unimpressed with what it portends for the giant auto maker.
To distill the well-written article to its essence, the Brazilian unit of Ford has scored major gains with a new SUV model by doing two things: sensibly restructuring the physical manner in which they produce the car, and doing intensive consumer market research to design a car which the relevant market segment will buy, at a profitable (to Ford) price.
The good news, of course, is that some people at Ford down in Brazil, led by one Luc de Ferran, pulled this off. It's inspirational, and certainly better, as the saying goes, "than a sharp stick in the eye."
However, the bad news is that this "turnaround" at Ford Brazil is nothing fancy. Basically, the unit had fallen on extremely bad times, and simply rediscovered what, I believe, intelligent business people everywhere would acknowledge are obvious maxims.
They redesigned manufacturing to adapt to current realities, thus cutting wasted time and expense. They returned to classic marketing in the design of a new vehicle, using consumer research to uncover wants and needs, the incorporation of which, in the new Ecosport SUV, caused the car to gain an 80% market share.
This anecdote brings me to recall some of my prior posts regarding mediocrity and ineptitude in the general business environment. Specifically, this post about UAL, this one about Starbucks, and this one about Intel v. AMD.
Why is that Ford's Brazilian unit, or, for that matter, Ford itself, globally, must have its back to the wall in order to rediscover basic business sensibilities?
I suspect that the reason boils down to one word- discipline.
In a process which parallels Aristotle's thoughts on the decline of governmental systems from the pinnacle, the 'philosopher-kin' phase, I think corporate leadership/management undergoes something very similar.
When a company is "on top," competitively and in terms of consistently delivering superior total returns for shareholders, a sense of complacency begins to set in. The questioning, innovative behaviors which probably drove the company's success, begin to be institutionalized by a second tier of acolytes as 'revered processes.' The originators of the initial success move on- retirement of the lauded CEO, perhaps a few SVPs move to head other companies. Too, some of the wizards of the successful change are promoted, focus upward, and leave the nuts and bolts continuation of the success to less-capable subordinates. The new generation of leaders begin to do two things: view the changes wrought by the earlier successful managers as 'codes to live by,' missing the fundamental value of the changes having led to success, not the particular endpoint of the organizational, product, etc, changes, and; beginning to introduce some of their own changes.
Truth be told, management teams that drive companies to truly excellent, consistently superior performances, are pretty rare. Whomever comes after them, like Paul Otellini at Intel, faces are daunting, and, essentially, more difficult task.
In time, the company begins to fill with lesser-talented management, its performance coasting to 'good,' from 'consistently superior.' The focus on prior methods and successes makes it hard for a less-talented group to recapture the successes of an early management generation.
If the company is lucky, another group will rise and repeat the earlier fundamental business practices that, once again, restore manufacturing, production, and/or service delivery to more productive levels, while introducing more relevant new products and services.
In short, it seems that, in large companies, there is simply a lack of discipline, over time, of management to value and retain a focus on 'purposeful change' of the company and its practices. It's as if nobody watches the measurements of performance which might signal that it's time for the company to innovate and change once again.
So, in a sense, Ford is no different, I suppose, than the average US company. And that's both a pity, and, I think, my point. The WSJ piece merely confirms that Ford is a normal US large-cap manufacturer that loses its way more often than it finds it.
Trouble is, today, it may have much less time and financial leeway to recover one more time.
Saturday, July 08, 2006
Why Consistency?
At lunch with my partner last week, we discussed why we have a long-term approach, in a market of frequent trading. We hold portfolios for months, rather than trade monthly, let alone weekly or daily. And our analysis takes into account several years of performance, in order to find consistently superior performers to buy and hold.
This market demonstrates why. Volatility is very high over short periods of time. Given the various forces and factors influencing investors- Fed rate hikes, oil and natural gas supply, Mideast oil supply worries, and, now, North Korean aggression- market prices in various equity sectors gyrate swiftly.
In my proprietary research, I found that many 3-year phenomenons are not 4 year successes. While the average returns for the market is remarkably stable over various timeframes, the standard deviations of those returns are markedly higher for relatively short time periods- less than 4 years.
In fact, some returns which are not even beyond one standard deviation from the market average return at 2 years will be well beyond that measure at 4 years. This means it is a much less rare event over a short timeframe, and a much more rare event over the longer timeframe.
Thus, the loss rate would be high for equity selections, based upon extraordinary 2-year returns. Seasoning the selections for 2, or even 1, more year, knocks out quite a few of them.
What it boils down to, from my research, is that the best way to select for consistently superior performing companies in the near future, is to find which ones have already been doing it in the past. From various prior posts on this blog, it should be evident that I do not hold out much hope for the broad mass of average employees, managers, CEOs and companies to change their behaviors and suddenly become above-average. It is much less risky to find companies which already display consistently superior performance, and simply expect a little more of it over the coming months.
This market demonstrates why. Volatility is very high over short periods of time. Given the various forces and factors influencing investors- Fed rate hikes, oil and natural gas supply, Mideast oil supply worries, and, now, North Korean aggression- market prices in various equity sectors gyrate swiftly.
In my proprietary research, I found that many 3-year phenomenons are not 4 year successes. While the average returns for the market is remarkably stable over various timeframes, the standard deviations of those returns are markedly higher for relatively short time periods- less than 4 years.
In fact, some returns which are not even beyond one standard deviation from the market average return at 2 years will be well beyond that measure at 4 years. This means it is a much less rare event over a short timeframe, and a much more rare event over the longer timeframe.
Thus, the loss rate would be high for equity selections, based upon extraordinary 2-year returns. Seasoning the selections for 2, or even 1, more year, knocks out quite a few of them.
What it boils down to, from my research, is that the best way to select for consistently superior performing companies in the near future, is to find which ones have already been doing it in the past. From various prior posts on this blog, it should be evident that I do not hold out much hope for the broad mass of average employees, managers, CEOs and companies to change their behaviors and suddenly become above-average. It is much less risky to find companies which already display consistently superior performance, and simply expect a little more of it over the coming months.
Friday, July 07, 2006
Kerkorian's GM Alliance: Almost Time for a Victory Lap
Two articles in this week's Wall Street Journal, plus extensive coverage on CNBC, have laid out what Kirk Kerkorian has planned for GM. He's aiming to engineer GM's entrance into the Carlos Goshn-run alliance of Renault and Nissan.
Holman Jenkins wrote very succinctly about exactly what is going on here, in his regular weekly WSJ column. In effect, he said, Kerkorian is prepared to offer GM to Goshn, to finally get Goshn to run the place, since he couldn't lure Goshn to GM outright.
With the added talk of GM CEO Rick Wagoner's departure, should this occur, it demonstrates that there is a more serious approach to fixing GM. Wagoner is written up as the champion of a 'slow and steady' turnaround. Goshn has credentials for having actually succeeded in a rapid, well-motivated restructuring of his car company alliance. Rather than creep along with half-measures, Goshn confronted and acknowledged the severity of his situation, and moved adroitly and quickly to save his firm from collapse.
I wrote here, here, and here, back in the fall of last year, about GM's serious likelihood of losing its corporate life, and/or its independence. I see that I gave the company until the end of the decade, whereas I thought I had predicted this end within 24 months.
In either case, while it's too early to take my victory lap now, for being right, I'll get the track shoes out and begin stretching.
Reading these prior posts I have linked above, it reminds me of how much in denial the analyst media and consulting community have been about GM's and Ford's actual peril. They all seemed to worried about angering a still-spending auto giant to do their jobs and tell the truth.
Well, now they are reporting the truth, as it happens in front of them. Rather like the brokerage firms that downgrade a stock the day after it drops 20%.
You heard a warning of the fatal condition of GM here first. Having nothing to lose, it seemed easy to me to call what I saw, and reason that GM does not have long to live as an independent auto producer. Above all else, their long-running inability to design and market cars many people will pay sufficient prices for, has doomed the company. It's simply too late for them to overcome years of bad leadership and management.
Between economic uncertainty, energy prices, and competitive pressures, GM can no longer afford even one misstep. That's just too much risk for Kerkorian to take on his substantial investment. You have to hand it to the wily old guy. He has totally outsmarted the corps of analysts and media onlookers who have been clucking at Kirk's loss of touch in the GM caper.
This past week, all I hear and read about is how Kerkorian is slyly engineering a no-premium takeover, sans proxy fight and board battle. And he's even brought allies to the table that nobody had dared consider even a month ago. Talk about insight, discipline and fortitude. Kerkorian would seem to have earned every cent he's made with his bare-knuckle investing style.
If all goes well, Kerkorian will let common sense and fiduciary duty pressure the GM board into accepting his recommendation for the three-way alliance, run by Goshn. Wagoner will depart. And my prediction about GM or Ford leaving the field of independent car makers will come true way ahead of schedule.
Holman Jenkins wrote very succinctly about exactly what is going on here, in his regular weekly WSJ column. In effect, he said, Kerkorian is prepared to offer GM to Goshn, to finally get Goshn to run the place, since he couldn't lure Goshn to GM outright.
With the added talk of GM CEO Rick Wagoner's departure, should this occur, it demonstrates that there is a more serious approach to fixing GM. Wagoner is written up as the champion of a 'slow and steady' turnaround. Goshn has credentials for having actually succeeded in a rapid, well-motivated restructuring of his car company alliance. Rather than creep along with half-measures, Goshn confronted and acknowledged the severity of his situation, and moved adroitly and quickly to save his firm from collapse.
I wrote here, here, and here, back in the fall of last year, about GM's serious likelihood of losing its corporate life, and/or its independence. I see that I gave the company until the end of the decade, whereas I thought I had predicted this end within 24 months.
In either case, while it's too early to take my victory lap now, for being right, I'll get the track shoes out and begin stretching.
Reading these prior posts I have linked above, it reminds me of how much in denial the analyst media and consulting community have been about GM's and Ford's actual peril. They all seemed to worried about angering a still-spending auto giant to do their jobs and tell the truth.
Well, now they are reporting the truth, as it happens in front of them. Rather like the brokerage firms that downgrade a stock the day after it drops 20%.
You heard a warning of the fatal condition of GM here first. Having nothing to lose, it seemed easy to me to call what I saw, and reason that GM does not have long to live as an independent auto producer. Above all else, their long-running inability to design and market cars many people will pay sufficient prices for, has doomed the company. It's simply too late for them to overcome years of bad leadership and management.
Between economic uncertainty, energy prices, and competitive pressures, GM can no longer afford even one misstep. That's just too much risk for Kerkorian to take on his substantial investment. You have to hand it to the wily old guy. He has totally outsmarted the corps of analysts and media onlookers who have been clucking at Kirk's loss of touch in the GM caper.
This past week, all I hear and read about is how Kerkorian is slyly engineering a no-premium takeover, sans proxy fight and board battle. And he's even brought allies to the table that nobody had dared consider even a month ago. Talk about insight, discipline and fortitude. Kerkorian would seem to have earned every cent he's made with his bare-knuckle investing style.
If all goes well, Kerkorian will let common sense and fiduciary duty pressure the GM board into accepting his recommendation for the three-way alliance, run by Goshn. Wagoner will depart. And my prediction about GM or Ford leaving the field of independent car makers will come true way ahead of schedule.
Thursday, July 06, 2006
Corporate Governance: Bob Nardelli's Interview on CNBC
As I write this post, I am listening to/watching Maria Bartiromo's interview with Bob Nardelli, CEO of Home Depot. Irrespective of my prior remarks about Bartiromo, she is certainly giving Nardelli a fairly "hardball" interview. To my pleasant surprise, she has asked direct questions about Nardelli's annual meeting fiasco.
As for Nardelli, his performance in the interview's opening moments is nothing short of robotic. Clearly, Home Depot hired the best public relations talent they could find to carefully script his remarks about the annual meeting. Nardelli was obviously told to "stick to the script," period. No deviations. No ad libs.
That script consisted of simply saying, to paraphrase, "We tried a new style of annual meeting. I take full responsibility. It didn't work well. We will return to our prior format next year." When Bartiromo pushed him for an answer as to why the director-less format was tried this year (and, to her credit, she actually asked, verbatim, "what were you thinking?!"), he repeated, several times, again, to paraphrase, "We are a society that likes to ask questions and blame. This is in the past. We won't do it again. We'll go back to our prior format next year." Meaning, he is not about to discuss the highly probably reason for the attempt to muzzle shareholders- his egregious pay package in the face of consistently poor shareholder returns for the 5 or so years he has run Home Depot.
As to the matter of his options, he avoided admitting the rules were changed for him, to his benefit, regarding the awarding of the options. Rather, he kept stressing that, if he doesn't get the stock price above the strike price, he receives nothing. Again, ducking the "why" and focusing on the "what if?"
Nardelli then went on to extol his supportive board. Yes, with the compensation treatment he's gotten, what else would you expect? Further, he spoke of their patience and support for his strategy. Meaning, I guess, that he's happy they haven't noticed that, under his leadership, Home Depot's total returns have been abysmal. According to Bartiromo, the company's stock has plunged 30% during his tenure. And 20% over the last 5 years. Lowes has done much better for its shareholders over the past 5 years.
His clever attempt to dodge responsibility is to lay it on....his board of directors. According to Nardelli, since his board has continued to employ and pay him handsomely, he must be doing alright. Nevermind that, like most boards, they would be beholden to him for nomination and continued membership. Nice 'virtuous' circle for Bob and his board- not so nice for the company's owners.
In his "final remarks," as solicited by Bartiromo, Nardelli sidesteps the poor total returns, and hammers away at the fundamental financial results, and, in his opinion, the company's 'solid commitment to corporate governance.' In short, he's being paid millions of dollars, but hasn't a clue how to affect his company's performance in ways which will result in consistently superior returns for his shareholders.
It was an interesting experience to watch a very nervous CEO bob and weave his way through a minefield of negative topics without departing from his carefully rehearsed script. He simply denied that Home Depot has problems which he is capable of solving. That is, something outside of his control is responsible for all their woes.
If I were a Home Depot shareholder, I'd want a new CEO, effective immediately. If the CEO doesn't see himself as responsible for the mediocre returns of the company he leads, and has no ideas on how to affect that performance, how can the company go wrong replacing him with someone who will try to boost the company's total return performance?
As for Nardelli, his performance in the interview's opening moments is nothing short of robotic. Clearly, Home Depot hired the best public relations talent they could find to carefully script his remarks about the annual meeting. Nardelli was obviously told to "stick to the script," period. No deviations. No ad libs.
That script consisted of simply saying, to paraphrase, "We tried a new style of annual meeting. I take full responsibility. It didn't work well. We will return to our prior format next year." When Bartiromo pushed him for an answer as to why the director-less format was tried this year (and, to her credit, she actually asked, verbatim, "what were you thinking?!"), he repeated, several times, again, to paraphrase, "We are a society that likes to ask questions and blame. This is in the past. We won't do it again. We'll go back to our prior format next year." Meaning, he is not about to discuss the highly probably reason for the attempt to muzzle shareholders- his egregious pay package in the face of consistently poor shareholder returns for the 5 or so years he has run Home Depot.
As to the matter of his options, he avoided admitting the rules were changed for him, to his benefit, regarding the awarding of the options. Rather, he kept stressing that, if he doesn't get the stock price above the strike price, he receives nothing. Again, ducking the "why" and focusing on the "what if?"
Nardelli then went on to extol his supportive board. Yes, with the compensation treatment he's gotten, what else would you expect? Further, he spoke of their patience and support for his strategy. Meaning, I guess, that he's happy they haven't noticed that, under his leadership, Home Depot's total returns have been abysmal. According to Bartiromo, the company's stock has plunged 30% during his tenure. And 20% over the last 5 years. Lowes has done much better for its shareholders over the past 5 years.His clever attempt to dodge responsibility is to lay it on....his board of directors. According to Nardelli, since his board has continued to employ and pay him handsomely, he must be doing alright. Nevermind that, like most boards, they would be beholden to him for nomination and continued membership. Nice 'virtuous' circle for Bob and his board- not so nice for the company's owners.
In his "final remarks," as solicited by Bartiromo, Nardelli sidesteps the poor total returns, and hammers away at the fundamental financial results, and, in his opinion, the company's 'solid commitment to corporate governance.' In short, he's being paid millions of dollars, but hasn't a clue how to affect his company's performance in ways which will result in consistently superior returns for his shareholders.
It was an interesting experience to watch a very nervous CEO bob and weave his way through a minefield of negative topics without departing from his carefully rehearsed script. He simply denied that Home Depot has problems which he is capable of solving. That is, something outside of his control is responsible for all their woes.
If I were a Home Depot shareholder, I'd want a new CEO, effective immediately. If the CEO doesn't see himself as responsible for the mediocre returns of the company he leads, and has no ideas on how to affect that performance, how can the company go wrong replacing him with someone who will try to boost the company's total return performance?
Time Warner and AOL Give Up on Marketing Management
Time Warner's latest plans for its AOL subsidiary are curious for their abandonment of marketing management principles. As I understand the plan, they are considering giving the entire AOL package, including email, free, to anyone with a high speed connection, just like yahoo, msn, and google.
On one hand, this may seem like a recognition that AOL really offers little of value for which people will pay, when the aforementioned alternatives are available.
However, AOL does earn revenue from users, despite the alternatives. Some people probably have both- an AOL account for which they pay, and use as an ISP, as well as free email accounts with one or more of the other providers.
Is it really smart to paint all of your customers with the same brush, and offer any of them who have their own access a 100% discount on the service? Are there not any user segments who will remain with AOL on a paying basis? Since they have that $2B of annual revenue already, why prematurely and voluntarily refund much of it? Why not raise prices on the most primitive, dial-up users, and maintain prices on those who, for whatever reason, still don't move their high-speed accessed accounts elsewhere?
Thinking back to my prior post, about Wal-Mart's foray into financial services, it seems that Time Warner is taking the opposite tack. Whereas Wal-Mart focuses on how to segment its customers, and better serve them through that understanding, Time Warner seems to be going the opposite way. They just lump most of their customer base into one bucket, and give their service to those people. Whomever they are. AOL isn't even talking about, say, developing customer profiles to use in making offers of reduced priced services to those most likely to leave AOL.
I think this reinforces the view that AOL is mismanaged, and Time Warner is compounding the problem with another layer of inept management on top of the online unit.
Carl Icahn, please call home......
On one hand, this may seem like a recognition that AOL really offers little of value for which people will pay, when the aforementioned alternatives are available.
However, AOL does earn revenue from users, despite the alternatives. Some people probably have both- an AOL account for which they pay, and use as an ISP, as well as free email accounts with one or more of the other providers.
Is it really smart to paint all of your customers with the same brush, and offer any of them who have their own access a 100% discount on the service? Are there not any user segments who will remain with AOL on a paying basis? Since they have that $2B of annual revenue already, why prematurely and voluntarily refund much of it? Why not raise prices on the most primitive, dial-up users, and maintain prices on those who, for whatever reason, still don't move their high-speed accessed accounts elsewhere?
Thinking back to my prior post, about Wal-Mart's foray into financial services, it seems that Time Warner is taking the opposite tack. Whereas Wal-Mart focuses on how to segment its customers, and better serve them through that understanding, Time Warner seems to be going the opposite way. They just lump most of their customer base into one bucket, and give their service to those people. Whomever they are. AOL isn't even talking about, say, developing customer profiles to use in making offers of reduced priced services to those most likely to leave AOL.
I think this reinforces the view that AOL is mismanaged, and Time Warner is compounding the problem with another layer of inept management on top of the online unit.
Carl Icahn, please call home......
Wal-Mart's Big Financial Services Dreams
Today's Wall Street Journal contains a story about Wal-Mart's planned big push into low-end financial services. We are talking here about payroll check cashing, wiring money, and bill paying.
From reading the article, it looks like Wal-Mart, with its size and diversified business lines, will be able to offer these services at a significant discount to the prices typically charged by those vendors who prey on low-income financial services customers. Perhaps the best example is payroll check cashing. Your typical local 'service' provider will charge a user 2-3% of the face value of the check. Wal-Mart charges a maximum of $3/check. Do the math, and for a blue-collar worker who earns $20,000/year and is paid something like $650, net, every two weeks, the average current check-cashing fee is nearly $16. So Wal-Mart will be providing enormous value to low-income consumers, who also happen to be its major target market. The company noted that it also currently processes 1.5-2MM money-services transactions per week.
On first glance, I thought Wal-Mart might get tarred for this business expansion. You can just imagine some consumer advocates picketing the big-box giant, charging that it is merely jumping in to get its share of vigorish from its financially struggling customer base.
But that doesn't seem to be the case at all here. Wal-Mart's money orders cost $.46, compared with $1.30 at the US post office. The company appears to be delivering substantial value to its customers with this suite of services.
However, that said, I don't think it's going to do an awfully lot of good for Wal-Mart over the long haul. In response to charges by a spokesman for the Massachusetts Bankers Association that "Wal-Mart wants people to cash their checks in their stores so they can then make impulse purchases in the store," the company replied that only 'about 14% of people who cash checks at the store make purchases at the same time,' according to the WSJ article. That would work out to about one collateral purchase trip for every 7-8 financial service visits. In effect, 6 times per year.
And, by the way, kudos to the bankers in Massachusetts for managing to come off explicitly as a group of bloodsuckers. By saying it's ok to charge egregious fees on check cashing for poor people, but heaven forbid those people save on the fees and spend some of that extra money on real goods they can take home with them, this group appears to want a monopoly on taking advantage of the least-well off in our society. At least Wal-Mart has demonstrated that, by intervening, they will actually give these poor people real benefits that they can't get from today's banking sector.
So, essentially, what we have is the Schumpterian phenomenon of Wal-Mart weighing in to gut value-added dollars in the low-end financial services sector, in order to transfer some of that value to its customers, thereby strengthening the company's position in that segment. I don't think Wal-Mart will profit, per se, from this move. It is mostly defensive.
In fact, it kind of makes you wonder what happened to Wal-Mart's purported move, last year, upmarket. Isn't this financial service expansion at the low end going to blur that repositioning?
It seems kind of ironic to me, by the way, how things have come full circle. Back in 1974, in my very first marketing class, I learned that Sears was then earning more gross dollars of revenue on the interest in charged on customer credit card balances, than it earned on merchandise margins. Of course, in the intervening 32 years, that has been radically changed. Retailers lost the entire captive financial services business to GE and the banking sector. Now, a large, cost-effective retailer comes back in to underprice the financial service sector on low-end services, in order to build more customer loyalty and, probably, gain some extra margin/square foot of floor space.
From reading the article, it looks like Wal-Mart, with its size and diversified business lines, will be able to offer these services at a significant discount to the prices typically charged by those vendors who prey on low-income financial services customers. Perhaps the best example is payroll check cashing. Your typical local 'service' provider will charge a user 2-3% of the face value of the check. Wal-Mart charges a maximum of $3/check. Do the math, and for a blue-collar worker who earns $20,000/year and is paid something like $650, net, every two weeks, the average current check-cashing fee is nearly $16. So Wal-Mart will be providing enormous value to low-income consumers, who also happen to be its major target market. The company noted that it also currently processes 1.5-2MM money-services transactions per week.
On first glance, I thought Wal-Mart might get tarred for this business expansion. You can just imagine some consumer advocates picketing the big-box giant, charging that it is merely jumping in to get its share of vigorish from its financially struggling customer base.
But that doesn't seem to be the case at all here. Wal-Mart's money orders cost $.46, compared with $1.30 at the US post office. The company appears to be delivering substantial value to its customers with this suite of services.
However, that said, I don't think it's going to do an awfully lot of good for Wal-Mart over the long haul. In response to charges by a spokesman for the Massachusetts Bankers Association that "Wal-Mart wants people to cash their checks in their stores so they can then make impulse purchases in the store," the company replied that only 'about 14% of people who cash checks at the store make purchases at the same time,' according to the WSJ article. That would work out to about one collateral purchase trip for every 7-8 financial service visits. In effect, 6 times per year.
And, by the way, kudos to the bankers in Massachusetts for managing to come off explicitly as a group of bloodsuckers. By saying it's ok to charge egregious fees on check cashing for poor people, but heaven forbid those people save on the fees and spend some of that extra money on real goods they can take home with them, this group appears to want a monopoly on taking advantage of the least-well off in our society. At least Wal-Mart has demonstrated that, by intervening, they will actually give these poor people real benefits that they can't get from today's banking sector.
So, essentially, what we have is the Schumpterian phenomenon of Wal-Mart weighing in to gut value-added dollars in the low-end financial services sector, in order to transfer some of that value to its customers, thereby strengthening the company's position in that segment. I don't think Wal-Mart will profit, per se, from this move. It is mostly defensive.
In fact, it kind of makes you wonder what happened to Wal-Mart's purported move, last year, upmarket. Isn't this financial service expansion at the low end going to blur that repositioning?
It seems kind of ironic to me, by the way, how things have come full circle. Back in 1974, in my very first marketing class, I learned that Sears was then earning more gross dollars of revenue on the interest in charged on customer credit card balances, than it earned on merchandise margins. Of course, in the intervening 32 years, that has been radically changed. Retailers lost the entire captive financial services business to GE and the banking sector. Now, a large, cost-effective retailer comes back in to underprice the financial service sector on low-end services, in order to build more customer loyalty and, probably, gain some extra margin/square foot of floor space.
More on Corporate Governance: Executive Compensation Continues to Rise
The Wall Street Journal recently used the occasion of Pfizer's annual meeting to run yet another piece about exorbitant CEO compensation packages. Carol Hymowitz wrote a very nice piece detailing the realities of this problem.
When asked to defend Pfizer CEO Hank McKinnell's compensation, Dana Mead, head of the board's compsenation committee, did so by saying, '....Mr. McKinnell's pay was based on market forces and reflected his responsibility overseeing 110,000 employees."
The article notes that "disgruntled shareholders even tried to unseat Mr. Mead and another director this past April but failed."
What is irksome to me is that Mr. Mead didn't say something like, "Mr. McKinnell has the responsibility to earn above-average total returns for you shareholders. In hopes of attracting talented leaders to be our company's CEO, and make that happen, we need to offer a competitive compensation package. If Mr. McKinnell proves unable to meet this responsibility, he will be replaced with someone in whom we, your board members, feel is better-equipped to carry out this responsibility."
Ms. Hymowitz quotes Lucian Bebchuk, a Harvard University law professor, who notes that the board is beholden to the CEO for their membership and, thus, pretty much have to repay him/her with bloated compensation packages, and that "they don't have an incentive to change those arrangements."
Well, that really says it all, doesn't it? You have a board charged with CEO oversight, but who nominates the board? The CEO. Wonderful! I guess having no board is marginally more corrupt, but, judging by modern CEO compensation and corporate total return performances, not by much.
Though the article closes with comments on the competition for good CEOs as the reason for excessive compensation packages, I have my doubts about that. Look at corporate performance, and you'll see that very few CEOs seem to be able to achieve consistently superior returns for their shareholders. It should be fairly easy to design a CEO compensation package with the predominant proportion of it structured as variable, and payable upon attainment of consistently superior returns for the shareholders. That way, shareholders only pay for the performance. As I have written elsewhere on this blog, why would you want a CEO who doesn't think s/he can do this in the first place?
When asked to defend Pfizer CEO Hank McKinnell's compensation, Dana Mead, head of the board's compsenation committee, did so by saying, '....Mr. McKinnell's pay was based on market forces and reflected his responsibility overseeing 110,000 employees."
The article notes that "disgruntled shareholders even tried to unseat Mr. Mead and another director this past April but failed."
What is irksome to me is that Mr. Mead didn't say something like, "Mr. McKinnell has the responsibility to earn above-average total returns for you shareholders. In hopes of attracting talented leaders to be our company's CEO, and make that happen, we need to offer a competitive compensation package. If Mr. McKinnell proves unable to meet this responsibility, he will be replaced with someone in whom we, your board members, feel is better-equipped to carry out this responsibility."
Ms. Hymowitz quotes Lucian Bebchuk, a Harvard University law professor, who notes that the board is beholden to the CEO for their membership and, thus, pretty much have to repay him/her with bloated compensation packages, and that "they don't have an incentive to change those arrangements."
Well, that really says it all, doesn't it? You have a board charged with CEO oversight, but who nominates the board? The CEO. Wonderful! I guess having no board is marginally more corrupt, but, judging by modern CEO compensation and corporate total return performances, not by much.
Though the article closes with comments on the competition for good CEOs as the reason for excessive compensation packages, I have my doubts about that. Look at corporate performance, and you'll see that very few CEOs seem to be able to achieve consistently superior returns for their shareholders. It should be fairly easy to design a CEO compensation package with the predominant proportion of it structured as variable, and payable upon attainment of consistently superior returns for the shareholders. That way, shareholders only pay for the performance. As I have written elsewhere on this blog, why would you want a CEO who doesn't think s/he can do this in the first place?
Sunday, July 02, 2006
Ford & GM: Recent Developments
Ford and GM's recent developments were the subject of a short piece in this week's Wall Street Journal. The author of the piece only went back to January of this year to issue his opinion. His verdict was that GM is in better shape for a "turnaround" because of outside pressure from Kerkorian, while Ford's two-class stock structure kept its value from rising due to the founding family's insulation from common investors. His conclusion is that Ford is less market-sensitive, due to the Ford family's near-controlling 40% voting stake in the firm.
I find this a touch myopic, as the longterm Yahoo chart above shows. Comparing the S&P500, GM and Ford since 1979, it puts the lie to the notion that Ford has typically been slow to respond to market forces, due to the Ford family's control of the firm. Sure, in 2006, GM has displayed a better shareholder return than that of Ford. No question about that. Just not being in Chapter 11 yet is probably a big boost for GM.
However, if you look carefully at the chart above, it continues to echo what I discussed in a recent post about these two firms. While Ford's voting structure may shield it somewhat from market forces, it still has outperformed GM over the past quarter century. And by a rather handsome margin, as GM has been negative, while Ford looks to have returned something in the neighborhood (interpolating on the chart above) of 100%. The S&P returned roughly 1000% over the period.
That Ford had some significant "up" periods, from the early 1980s to 2000, suggests that they were, in fact, quite sensitive to shareholder returns. GM, by contrast, rarely broke out of a flat return curve, save for a few years in the late 1990s.
My point is that, due to an unnecessarily short analytical time horizon, the WSJ has summarily judged Ford to be too insular to save now. While GM, through the mixed blessing of attracting Kirk Kerkorian, and his lieutenant, Jerry York's advice to find a global partner, has temporarily surged ahead of the former in total return terms.
I don't necessarily believe Bill Ford is turning, or will turn around Ford. His "way forward" seems "way too optimistic," in my opinion. If only because the management team that got you to where Ford is now, is unlikely to take you somewhere else, as a shareholder. But the company is sensitive to market pressures all on its own.
I don't think GM is more "investor sensitive." Instead, it has to deal with a veteran value shopper, in Kerkorian. As the WSJ, as well as CNBC, articulated, what's good for GM shareholders, the prospect of a partial rescue in the form of some global tie-up with the likes of Nissan, is probably not good for CEO Wagoner. If anything, Wagoner put GM where it is today through his learned insensitivity to market forces, as a result of a long tenure at the stumbling auto giant.
Yes, GM may well have marginally brighter prospects for its shareholders. But don't attribute GM's idiosyncratic fortune to Ford's share voting structure. Ford is in trouble due to inept management that has tried to grapple with global pressures on an aged, badly-led competitor. Not due to an unwillingness to acknowledge the problem.
YouTube Comes Out of the Garage
YouTube must be nearing a significant milestone of some sort. The Wall Street Journal mentioned it in two different pieces in the last two weeks.
One piece covered a multitude of approaches being developed to provide video from the web to the home. YouTube doesn't address the last few feet, from the cable to the TV. But it is far and away the most visited video website, according to the WSJ's article.
What is remarkable about YouTube is that you can see it visibly following in the footsteps of Microsoft, eBay, Yahoo and Google. It was fashioned as a personal solution to a problem- sharing large video files between friends and acquaintances.
It's now become larger, gotten VC funding ($3.5MM from Sequoia), hired a Yahoo veteran to build their sales team, and begun to explore longer-term profitability models linked to their core service.
Along the way, commenting on these points, and the huge traffic YouTube boasts ( 3 million videos viewed daily, as of Dec. 15, 2005), the Journal pointed out that the two founders, literally in the apocryphal garage, had out-innovated a host of existing, large media companies ( e.g., see my recent post on moribund Time Warner). Now, several large media corporations are rumored to be sniffing around YouTube, looking to acquire it.
It's truly gratifying to see this type of company develop as it has. For me, it maintains and nourishes my faith in enterprises which begin with keen consumer behavioral insights and a savvy, gritty sense of implementation. Rather than oozing forth from the likes of Disney or Time Warner, this type of high-energy, edgy operation springs up from virtually "nowhere." Mainstream media firms would probably bog down over the copyright issues that YouTube has from user-posted content that is inappropriately published, resulting in their legal departments becoming profit centers due to bizarre time and cost-allocation methods. Instead, YouTube deals with these matter with alacrity, gently letting its popularity and 'cool' image persuade some of the larger copyright holders to look for ways to work together, rather than try to stomp YouTube out of existence.
I have no idea where these two guys and their firm will end up. But it's a lot of fun, and instructional, to watch them rip through the electronic media world, successfully meeting needs and attracting customers, while overpaid suits in the suites of a variety of larger competitors sit and stare at their coming downfall. I have to believe that Joseph Schumpeter would be extremely proud and not at all surprised to see YouTube rocketing across the online video publishing sky, threatening established vendors across the media sector.
One piece covered a multitude of approaches being developed to provide video from the web to the home. YouTube doesn't address the last few feet, from the cable to the TV. But it is far and away the most visited video website, according to the WSJ's article.
What is remarkable about YouTube is that you can see it visibly following in the footsteps of Microsoft, eBay, Yahoo and Google. It was fashioned as a personal solution to a problem- sharing large video files between friends and acquaintances.
It's now become larger, gotten VC funding ($3.5MM from Sequoia), hired a Yahoo veteran to build their sales team, and begun to explore longer-term profitability models linked to their core service.
Along the way, commenting on these points, and the huge traffic YouTube boasts ( 3 million videos viewed daily, as of Dec. 15, 2005), the Journal pointed out that the two founders, literally in the apocryphal garage, had out-innovated a host of existing, large media companies ( e.g., see my recent post on moribund Time Warner). Now, several large media corporations are rumored to be sniffing around YouTube, looking to acquire it.
It's truly gratifying to see this type of company develop as it has. For me, it maintains and nourishes my faith in enterprises which begin with keen consumer behavioral insights and a savvy, gritty sense of implementation. Rather than oozing forth from the likes of Disney or Time Warner, this type of high-energy, edgy operation springs up from virtually "nowhere." Mainstream media firms would probably bog down over the copyright issues that YouTube has from user-posted content that is inappropriately published, resulting in their legal departments becoming profit centers due to bizarre time and cost-allocation methods. Instead, YouTube deals with these matter with alacrity, gently letting its popularity and 'cool' image persuade some of the larger copyright holders to look for ways to work together, rather than try to stomp YouTube out of existence.
I have no idea where these two guys and their firm will end up. But it's a lot of fun, and instructional, to watch them rip through the electronic media world, successfully meeting needs and attracting customers, while overpaid suits in the suites of a variety of larger competitors sit and stare at their coming downfall. I have to believe that Joseph Schumpeter would be extremely proud and not at all surprised to see YouTube rocketing across the online video publishing sky, threatening established vendors across the media sector.
Thursday, June 29, 2006
Time Warner's Troubles Again
The Wall Street Journal ran another piece about TimeWarner's woes last Friday. I wrote about TWX recently here. The chart at the left displays the firm's performance, relative to the S&P500, over the last five years.
Rather than repeat what I wrote there, which is pretty recent, I'd like to use the continuing coverage of TimeWarner's troubles to discuss a root cause of the trouble. That cause is a confusion among senior management of growth and size.
Here's a quick primer. Growth prospects have and create value based upon their own performance. Adding or retaining growth prospects among a collection of non-growth units will hide the value created by the growth prospects. Being a large company is no longer value creating in and of itself, and certainly not in a fast-changing, technologically-affected sector like entertainment and communications.
Thus, Time Warner is now being run exactly wrong. It's a testament to a bygone age in which size conferred safety from takeovers. Dick Parsons points to a few units and assures investors that, any day now, TWX will pull out of its value-destroying tailspin.
The reality is this. In this day and age, small companies, like YouTube (to be covered in an imminent post) can create successfully, in a garage what large media companies cannot. Small startups can employ bright people, off-the-shelf technology and functional services (accounting, HR, sales, finance), get funding from VC's or other sources, and, ultimately, the market. In surprisingly short timeframes, they can commercialize and market products and services that a giant like Time Warner can only discuss and plan. If the latter could effectively implement the concept to begin with.
Time Warner is ailing because its many mediocre divisions, staffed by mediocre salaried employees, can't innovate and grow sufficiently to match competitors. The size of this congolmerate makes delivering excellent customer value at a profit a second-order issue, behind just "running the company."
According to the WSJ, TWX has lost 10% of it's market value since Icahn abandoned his attempt to get control of the board. Not surprising.
In such a dynamic sector as entertainment, why would anyone expect a large, multi-divisional dinosaur to create consistently-superior shareholder returns? The very size of TWX almost guarantees that some of their units will drag performance. Shareholders would be so much better off by a split of the firm into many pieces, each delivering superior value to consumers on its own, and earning consistently superior returns for its shareholders. The weak, lagging units would, necessarily, be dealt with as the market typically does- value destroyed, bought cheaply for restructuring, and removed as a burden on the better-performing growth prospects that are now hidden within Time Warner's vast collection of media businesses.
Wednesday, June 28, 2006
Bill Gates' New World
The business media was abuzz on Monday and Tuesday of this week with news of Bill Gates' best buddy, Warren Buffett's, gift of $37B to the former's foundation.
I caught part of the public relations event in which Bill, his wife, Melinda, and Warren Buffett announced the gift. Has anyone seen Bill Gates this happy and relaxed since his early days as a middling guest of Steve Jobs, when the latter was still doing battle with IBM in the mid-1980s?
Last month, I saw Gates interviewed on Donny Deutsch's "The Big Idea." When Deutsch asked Gates what Bill would say to the leaders of Google, if they were in the audience, Bill nervously mumbled something like, ".....ah...we're going to keep you guys honest." I wrote about it in this prior post. I'm sure that struck fear into the hearts of Google's leaders......NOT.
Then there was the WSJ story recently about Gates commissioning his former aide to develop a Microsoft VOIP telephony business. Let's see....Vonage is already out front, and SBC/ATT and Verizon are having their own troubles just treading water in the voice business. What is it Microsoft is going to bring to this market, besides some of that now-famous $35B cash hoard?
Oh, wait, Google's positioned in that space, too, with instant messaging and email......oops!
Corporate failures are replete with examples of companies whose only contribution to a new product/market was the cash they burned through, to their shareholders' dismay. Ask Carl Icahn about Blockbuster.
What seems unfailingly clear to me, now, is that Bill Gates is doing his shareholders a tremendous disservice by hanging around Microsoft headquarters. I have been saying for months, in various posts, that his last five years at the helm of the company he founded have been disastrous. It's past time for him to go. When he looks so elated at the chance to give someone else's money away, and be rid of the job of creating shareholder value, it's time for him to do the right thing- right now. Not in two more years.
I have to believe that Bill is eager to have a full-time job at which he cannot fail. Oh, sure, maybe the Google guys will somehow convince Warren Buffett to give them part of the $37B promised to Bill and Melinda's foundation, but that's a stretch.
I think the sooner Bill totally and completely separates himself from Microsoft, and concentrates on giving away the billions in his foundation, the better it will be for Microsoft shareholders. A new Chairman might even sweep out some of that board deadwood and get a few competent business people in there to help oversee an overdue transformation, unlikely as it would be to succeed.
Better late, than never.
I caught part of the public relations event in which Bill, his wife, Melinda, and Warren Buffett announced the gift. Has anyone seen Bill Gates this happy and relaxed since his early days as a middling guest of Steve Jobs, when the latter was still doing battle with IBM in the mid-1980s?
Last month, I saw Gates interviewed on Donny Deutsch's "The Big Idea." When Deutsch asked Gates what Bill would say to the leaders of Google, if they were in the audience, Bill nervously mumbled something like, ".....ah...we're going to keep you guys honest." I wrote about it in this prior post. I'm sure that struck fear into the hearts of Google's leaders......NOT.
Then there was the WSJ story recently about Gates commissioning his former aide to develop a Microsoft VOIP telephony business. Let's see....Vonage is already out front, and SBC/ATT and Verizon are having their own troubles just treading water in the voice business. What is it Microsoft is going to bring to this market, besides some of that now-famous $35B cash hoard?
Oh, wait, Google's positioned in that space, too, with instant messaging and email......oops!
Corporate failures are replete with examples of companies whose only contribution to a new product/market was the cash they burned through, to their shareholders' dismay. Ask Carl Icahn about Blockbuster.
What seems unfailingly clear to me, now, is that Bill Gates is doing his shareholders a tremendous disservice by hanging around Microsoft headquarters. I have been saying for months, in various posts, that his last five years at the helm of the company he founded have been disastrous. It's past time for him to go. When he looks so elated at the chance to give someone else's money away, and be rid of the job of creating shareholder value, it's time for him to do the right thing- right now. Not in two more years.
I have to believe that Bill is eager to have a full-time job at which he cannot fail. Oh, sure, maybe the Google guys will somehow convince Warren Buffett to give them part of the $37B promised to Bill and Melinda's foundation, but that's a stretch.
I think the sooner Bill totally and completely separates himself from Microsoft, and concentrates on giving away the billions in his foundation, the better it will be for Microsoft shareholders. A new Chairman might even sweep out some of that board deadwood and get a few competent business people in there to help oversee an overdue transformation, unlikely as it would be to succeed.
Better late, than never.
Boeing's Failed Connexion Business Venture
Here's another sad story from the inept marketing deparment files.
No less a corporate giant than Boeing is reported to be considering sale or closure of its Connexion internet venture. This is the business unit that provides the service to airlines which allows passengers to connect to the internet in flight.
According to the Wall Street Journal, in last Thursday's edition, the business is probably on Boeing's books for $1B of asset value, but may only have a market value of $150MM.
What surprised me is the marketing strategy that Boeing used for this service. At fees of $10-27/flight, on commercial carriers, it seems rather pricey for the expense budget set. Can you imagine a road warrior defending hundreds of dollars of connection fees per trip to his or her manager?
Additionally, these days, you'd think the aforementioned warrior enjoys the relatively brief period of inaccessibility. Perhaps s/he can actually use the time to think and reflect about business, rather than respond pell mell to various assaults from the laptop, blackberry and cell phone.
Apparently, Boeing belatedly decided to work with Rockwell Collins to outfit corporate (and, one assumes, time share) jets with this service. Wouldn't you think this would have been the first segment they went after? The folks who fly these planes are, by definition, seen as executives whose time is more valuable than the ones who fly commercial. One would think they could more easily, if it's even necessary, justify the Connexion fees for their trips. If it didn't "fly" with this group, it wouldn't succeed in the larger business travel community. But, if it did show promise in this more elite segment, the business would at least have bought some time to make further penetration into the business travel market.
It's astonishing that such a relatively simple business could be mismarketed and mismanaged. Especially when owned and staffed by a capable, credible, large US company of Boeing's stature.
It is understandable that not all ideas work out. But you'd think the more adventurous ones would be led and staffed by a more diligent and sensible group that knew basic market segmentation concepts, and how to implement them.
No less a corporate giant than Boeing is reported to be considering sale or closure of its Connexion internet venture. This is the business unit that provides the service to airlines which allows passengers to connect to the internet in flight.
According to the Wall Street Journal, in last Thursday's edition, the business is probably on Boeing's books for $1B of asset value, but may only have a market value of $150MM.
What surprised me is the marketing strategy that Boeing used for this service. At fees of $10-27/flight, on commercial carriers, it seems rather pricey for the expense budget set. Can you imagine a road warrior defending hundreds of dollars of connection fees per trip to his or her manager?
Additionally, these days, you'd think the aforementioned warrior enjoys the relatively brief period of inaccessibility. Perhaps s/he can actually use the time to think and reflect about business, rather than respond pell mell to various assaults from the laptop, blackberry and cell phone.
Apparently, Boeing belatedly decided to work with Rockwell Collins to outfit corporate (and, one assumes, time share) jets with this service. Wouldn't you think this would have been the first segment they went after? The folks who fly these planes are, by definition, seen as executives whose time is more valuable than the ones who fly commercial. One would think they could more easily, if it's even necessary, justify the Connexion fees for their trips. If it didn't "fly" with this group, it wouldn't succeed in the larger business travel community. But, if it did show promise in this more elite segment, the business would at least have bought some time to make further penetration into the business travel market.
It's astonishing that such a relatively simple business could be mismarketed and mismanaged. Especially when owned and staffed by a capable, credible, large US company of Boeing's stature.
It is understandable that not all ideas work out. But you'd think the more adventurous ones would be led and staffed by a more diligent and sensible group that knew basic market segmentation concepts, and how to implement them.
Monday, June 26, 2006
Basic Business Skills Seen Lacking in Recent News Articles
The Wall Street Journal featured two interesting articles last week which provide evidence of a continuing lack of skills in basic business management.
One piece concerned Zale jeweler's self-inflicted wounds over the two years. The chart at right (click on it for a full size version), from Yahoo, depicts the company's performance, relative to the S&P, for the past 5 years. Sure enough, the stock price has slid recently. What's interesting is that it was merely mediocre prior to that. It hadn't really fallen steeply since 2003.
According to the WSJ article, CEO Mary Forte assumed command and unilaterally took Zale from its low-end positioning as a purveyor of inexpensive diamonds, and frog-marched it upscale. Evidently on the basis of personal hunch and her affinity for upscale retail goods, Forte radically changed product mix and marketing plans. While the article paints a confused picture in which a board member, now interim CEO, alleges that Forte did not disclose the radical nature of her plans, a senior marketing officer claimed that she was refused a meeting with the board to explain the extent of the changes.
I find it amazing that, in this day and age, a major, albeit low-end, retailer like Zale could experience such seat-of-the-pants strategy and marketing shifts, amidst poor communications. As I have written regarding Wal-Mart's attempts to move upmarket, this kind of change is always fraught with risk. It's rare in retailing that a major company has successfully moved upmarket without taking a very, very long time to reposition itself.
A few days earlier, the WSJ ran a book review of a new tome from two BCG consultants. It is entitled, "Treasure Hunt," and provides the shocking news that consumers sometimes buy on price, and sometimes pay up for premium merchandise.
Stop the presses! Revamp the Wharton and Kellogg marketing curricula!
Really, are these guys serious? This has been a staple marketing truism since well before I went to undergraduate school in the late-1970s. That two consulting executives feel a need to illuminate the rest of us probably says more about their lack of knowledge of the past, and basic marketing, than about the novelty of their insights.
Truthfully, if these two guys, Michael J. Silverstein and John Butman, are surprised by these findings, would you want to pay them to learn more about business on your company's tab? The WSJ review by Laura Landro, for whom I have a good deal of respect, suggests that its unspecified citing of "BCG client work" for data, and its use of fairly generic insights on consumer buying behavior, makes it just the latest of a long series of popular rewrites of basic marketing knowledge and theory going back well over thirty years.
Once again, I wonder what it means that these authors thought they found something new, and someone thought this material of sufficient value to publish it. Probably that the average level of business acumen in US companies is far less than you really want to believe.
Mediocre MBA Applicant Pools
My partner and I were discussing the modern MBA full-time program the other day. Specifically, we were comparing notes on our situations as relatively inexperienced college graduates applying to Stanford and Wharton over 20 years ago, with a typical full-time, self-funded entrant to a top B-school now.
His point, with which I agree, is that business schools such as Columbia, Chicago, Stanford, MIT, Tuck, Harvard and Wharton, in all probability, no longer attract the best students to their day programs. Instead, they now attract a mediocre talent pool. This is largely because of the schools' insistence on substantial work experience by candidates prior to attending their programs.
Consider this. A bright young college graduate, after 4-5 years of experience, at a mid-large-sized company, is likely on a decent career path. These days, s/he could probably get the employer to pay for grad school. Otherwise, the potential B-school entrant has to forego two years' compensation, still pay for living expenses, plus the cost of grad school. Rough estimates for this are in the neighborhood, I believe, of $200K.
So, one has to ask, why would someone incur all that added expense, when an employer will consider funding a candidate and continuing to keep them on payroll, or perhaps give them leave, in order to retain top talent? One answer is, the current experienced, full-time, self-funded MBA candidate is not the most talented segment of potential program entrants.
My partner added, for good measure, the following hypothetical situation. If a young college grad is doing well at his or her job, some years out, would s/he really throw away all the progress, money, momentum, and contacts, for two years of self-funded school? A really good prospect can do better than taking him- or herself out of the workforce for two years on their own tab, only to have to start over career-wise.
And, in these days of leaner staffs and heavier workloads, perhaps the non-applicants get better experience and skills by remaining in the workforce, sans graduate degree, and taking on more responsibility. Perhaps this results in better-performing employees. Only two years ago, I read an HBR piece touting the MFA as the advanced degree of the future.
Frankly, even in my day, over two decades ago, quite a few of my fellow Penn grad students were far more interested in the added money they'd make upon graduation than in actually learning anything from their course work. Few had an active interest in learning a specific discipline, outside of career retreads wanting to enter the arcane world of M&A or financial instrument trading. I still read of 'best practices' in marketing which bear a striking similarity to those taught back when I was at Penn.
Perhaps this explains why, despite the usual outpouring of full-time business school grads from name programs, companies, on average, don't seem to run better, or make fewer management gaffes. It could well be that name-graduate business program education is of decent quality, but the students are not.
His point, with which I agree, is that business schools such as Columbia, Chicago, Stanford, MIT, Tuck, Harvard and Wharton, in all probability, no longer attract the best students to their day programs. Instead, they now attract a mediocre talent pool. This is largely because of the schools' insistence on substantial work experience by candidates prior to attending their programs.
Consider this. A bright young college graduate, after 4-5 years of experience, at a mid-large-sized company, is likely on a decent career path. These days, s/he could probably get the employer to pay for grad school. Otherwise, the potential B-school entrant has to forego two years' compensation, still pay for living expenses, plus the cost of grad school. Rough estimates for this are in the neighborhood, I believe, of $200K.
So, one has to ask, why would someone incur all that added expense, when an employer will consider funding a candidate and continuing to keep them on payroll, or perhaps give them leave, in order to retain top talent? One answer is, the current experienced, full-time, self-funded MBA candidate is not the most talented segment of potential program entrants.
My partner added, for good measure, the following hypothetical situation. If a young college grad is doing well at his or her job, some years out, would s/he really throw away all the progress, money, momentum, and contacts, for two years of self-funded school? A really good prospect can do better than taking him- or herself out of the workforce for two years on their own tab, only to have to start over career-wise.
And, in these days of leaner staffs and heavier workloads, perhaps the non-applicants get better experience and skills by remaining in the workforce, sans graduate degree, and taking on more responsibility. Perhaps this results in better-performing employees. Only two years ago, I read an HBR piece touting the MFA as the advanced degree of the future.
Frankly, even in my day, over two decades ago, quite a few of my fellow Penn grad students were far more interested in the added money they'd make upon graduation than in actually learning anything from their course work. Few had an active interest in learning a specific discipline, outside of career retreads wanting to enter the arcane world of M&A or financial instrument trading. I still read of 'best practices' in marketing which bear a striking similarity to those taught back when I was at Penn.
Perhaps this explains why, despite the usual outpouring of full-time business school grads from name programs, companies, on average, don't seem to run better, or make fewer management gaffes. It could well be that name-graduate business program education is of decent quality, but the students are not.
Sunday, June 25, 2006
"The Market, She Be Angry....."
My partner and I were, among the other topics I mentioned in my prior post, discussing how the media covers equity markets as if it is a living thing. Thus, the title, which my partner uttered comically to capture my description of CNBC's Bob Pisani's moronic commentary on equity market behavior last week during one of the down/flat days.
Despite the signs of investors waffling on the economy's health, Brian Wesbury commented that average mortgage interest rates are still a full point lower than they were during the last expansion. And the Fed is moving to ensure low, long-term inflation. Thus, there's no reason to expect the economy to suddenly sieze up and slide into a recession.
But, "the market, she be misguided" for now, I guess. The bulk of investors are too short-sighted, their memories too short, to see beyond a temporary period of seemingly mixed economic and market signals.
Of course, if they were otherwise, the better performers probably would not be better, because they would not be pre-positioned for the subsequent equity market rise, when these mediocre investors figure out there is no need to be cautious, and move back into equities.
I am reminded here of James O'Shaughnessy's admonition that even the best strategies can have periods of as long as two years of underperformance. Our own strategy strives for annual consistency, and has typically achieved it. Right now, with a market full of investors with no particular lasting directional disposition, our strategy is, as expected, underperforming. But it's only been so for a few months, and is unlikely to remain so for very long.
Researching the S&P's historical performance this morning, I found that it had a near-zero trailing 12-month return for several consecutive months only once in the last 15 years- from March, 1994, to January, 1995. Even now, the trailing S&P is above 6%. Last year's first half was similar to this year's in that, by the end of June, the market was negative for the year-to-date. What all this seems to indicate is that the last 3-4 months of weak market returns are unlikely to remain weak for long. Chances are that the index will either plummet or soar sometime within the next few months. And a strategy's relative, or even absolute, performance during these few months of investor indecision could well become moot in another 6 months.
".......the market, She be deliberating........."
Despite the signs of investors waffling on the economy's health, Brian Wesbury commented that average mortgage interest rates are still a full point lower than they were during the last expansion. And the Fed is moving to ensure low, long-term inflation. Thus, there's no reason to expect the economy to suddenly sieze up and slide into a recession.
But, "the market, she be misguided" for now, I guess. The bulk of investors are too short-sighted, their memories too short, to see beyond a temporary period of seemingly mixed economic and market signals.
Of course, if they were otherwise, the better performers probably would not be better, because they would not be pre-positioned for the subsequent equity market rise, when these mediocre investors figure out there is no need to be cautious, and move back into equities.
I am reminded here of James O'Shaughnessy's admonition that even the best strategies can have periods of as long as two years of underperformance. Our own strategy strives for annual consistency, and has typically achieved it. Right now, with a market full of investors with no particular lasting directional disposition, our strategy is, as expected, underperforming. But it's only been so for a few months, and is unlikely to remain so for very long.
Researching the S&P's historical performance this morning, I found that it had a near-zero trailing 12-month return for several consecutive months only once in the last 15 years- from March, 1994, to January, 1995. Even now, the trailing S&P is above 6%. Last year's first half was similar to this year's in that, by the end of June, the market was negative for the year-to-date. What all this seems to indicate is that the last 3-4 months of weak market returns are unlikely to remain weak for long. Chances are that the index will either plummet or soar sometime within the next few months. And a strategy's relative, or even absolute, performance during these few months of investor indecision could well become moot in another 6 months.
".......the market, She be deliberating........."
Friday, June 23, 2006
Current Equity Market Performance
I had a long meeting with my partner this week, and the topic of our portfolio strategy's performance arose. The strategy now trails the index by some 10 percentage points.
Earlier in the year, I was more perplexed and concerned by the portfolio's lackluster performance relative to the index. Now, however, it's clearer to me what is occurring.
Beginning with May's negative index return, the first this year, and continuing with a nearly equal performance so far in June, the S&P is now hovering at a 0% return for the year. Evidently, many investors have become so paralyzed and confused by various confusing signals regarding global economic activity and US inflation, that they are just treading water. They feel no compelling directional push from the mass of data.
As my partner and I discussed this, he asked if it were not true that, essentially, our position is, "we are right, and the market will come around sooner or later." Is this not rather arrogant, he thought? "Arrogant" may not have been the word he used- but his point was similar. Are we not "blaming" the market for our being behind, and accusing other investors of "getting it wrong" on equity valuations.
This led me to another application of my insight on mediocrity. If you search this blog for the term "mediocrity," or "mediocre," you will find several past blog posts which explain my thoughts on this important concept.
In the equity market, I believe that the vast preponderance of investors, institutional included, are mediocre, and, at times such as these, spend most of their energy being scared, trading aimlessly, and generally emitting no directional signal whatsoever.
We have a lot of apparently mixed signals in the market right now, if you aren't very savvy. There is the bugaboo of high energy prices. Then there's the Mideast situation overlay- Iran, Iraq, and even Nigerian supply issues. Commodity prices have been high, gold rose, and, in the US, the Fed is worried about the current rate of inflation.
Yet, US corporate performance is good, and commodity prices and demand signal continued healthy global growth.
My contention is that the "average" investor is now like a deer caught in the headlights of an oncoming car. S/he is frozen.
Taking a look at my portfolio selection process' recent results, I am struck by the continued significant presence of energy companies. Homebuilding fueled the portfolio's outstanding performance for some 18 months over the past two years. As the sector cooled, though, the companies in the sector that had been selected for the portfolio were gradually dropped by the process. Not so with energy. Something else is going on here. Despite this year's choppy return performance by many energy companies, they remain prominent in the model's selections.
My thinking is that this represents the system's reaction to a strong, if confusing, equity market situation. The portfolio strategy does worst with a near-zero index return. In times like these, growth equities are punished, but not so emphatically, for so long, as to justify shorting them.
Instead, we are in the position of remaining long prior to what I believe will be an awareness on the part of many market investors, later this year, that things are really quite attractive and healthy in the equity markets. Since our model is designed to be invested, and not in cash, we are now long, and, thus, behind a wavering market.
The recent occurrence of days of sharp gains and losses by the index and the portfolio, some approaching 4% daily, suggest to me that we are near a "bottom" of uncertainty-related trading. I expect that by summer's end, either the market will plunge, and our strategy will go short, or investors will realize that there is healthy fundamental global economic growth, and the equity market will advance sharply for several months.
Earlier in the year, I was more perplexed and concerned by the portfolio's lackluster performance relative to the index. Now, however, it's clearer to me what is occurring.
Beginning with May's negative index return, the first this year, and continuing with a nearly equal performance so far in June, the S&P is now hovering at a 0% return for the year. Evidently, many investors have become so paralyzed and confused by various confusing signals regarding global economic activity and US inflation, that they are just treading water. They feel no compelling directional push from the mass of data.
As my partner and I discussed this, he asked if it were not true that, essentially, our position is, "we are right, and the market will come around sooner or later." Is this not rather arrogant, he thought? "Arrogant" may not have been the word he used- but his point was similar. Are we not "blaming" the market for our being behind, and accusing other investors of "getting it wrong" on equity valuations.
This led me to another application of my insight on mediocrity. If you search this blog for the term "mediocrity," or "mediocre," you will find several past blog posts which explain my thoughts on this important concept.
In the equity market, I believe that the vast preponderance of investors, institutional included, are mediocre, and, at times such as these, spend most of their energy being scared, trading aimlessly, and generally emitting no directional signal whatsoever.
We have a lot of apparently mixed signals in the market right now, if you aren't very savvy. There is the bugaboo of high energy prices. Then there's the Mideast situation overlay- Iran, Iraq, and even Nigerian supply issues. Commodity prices have been high, gold rose, and, in the US, the Fed is worried about the current rate of inflation.
Yet, US corporate performance is good, and commodity prices and demand signal continued healthy global growth.
My contention is that the "average" investor is now like a deer caught in the headlights of an oncoming car. S/he is frozen.
Taking a look at my portfolio selection process' recent results, I am struck by the continued significant presence of energy companies. Homebuilding fueled the portfolio's outstanding performance for some 18 months over the past two years. As the sector cooled, though, the companies in the sector that had been selected for the portfolio were gradually dropped by the process. Not so with energy. Something else is going on here. Despite this year's choppy return performance by many energy companies, they remain prominent in the model's selections.
My thinking is that this represents the system's reaction to a strong, if confusing, equity market situation. The portfolio strategy does worst with a near-zero index return. In times like these, growth equities are punished, but not so emphatically, for so long, as to justify shorting them.
Instead, we are in the position of remaining long prior to what I believe will be an awareness on the part of many market investors, later this year, that things are really quite attractive and healthy in the equity markets. Since our model is designed to be invested, and not in cash, we are now long, and, thus, behind a wavering market.
The recent occurrence of days of sharp gains and losses by the index and the portfolio, some approaching 4% daily, suggest to me that we are near a "bottom" of uncertainty-related trading. I expect that by summer's end, either the market will plunge, and our strategy will go short, or investors will realize that there is healthy fundamental global economic growth, and the equity market will advance sharply for several months.
Thursday, June 22, 2006
Boeing v. Airbus: The Value of Executing Fundamentals
The Wall Street Journal has recently run several pieces on Boeing's resurgence at the expense of Airbus. Last Thursday, the article provided details of Airbus' sizable gamble on the A380.
What is very comforting to read is that Boeing learned what customers were doing- going for niche direct routes- and designed a plane for that. The 787 "Dreamliner."
Airbus, in contrast, continued to 'serve' the failed hub-spoke system, and launched an expensive program to produce the A380. As it turns out, there is little demand for the plane, even if it were not behind schedule and over budget.
Sometimes, success is just getting the fundamentals right when the other guy doesn't. Boeing excelled at the simple "blocking and tackling" of asking customers what they needed, what they were doing, and then provided a produce, the 787, tailored to those needs. Airbus did not.
As a result, Boeing's fortunes have steadily improved over the past several years (click on the chart above to see the larger version). Despite McNerney's recent arrival, and Boeing's past military program management/ethics problems, the commercial aircraft division seems to have done things right, and already begun to put Boeing on a path of consistent returns.
Wednesday, June 21, 2006
Cell Phone Video Content Provider Troubles
Last November, I wrote a piece about the likelihood that a lot of people will want to view video content over ipods and cell phones.
Yesterday's Wall Street Journal featured a piece that described the troubles of several new mobile media companies, including one involving ESPN.
While I continue to believe that an insufficient number of people will pay to watch large amounts of content on cell phones, I did not realize there is an additional wrinkle to these companies.
They are forming new mobile networks, using leased lines, to market their content. This seems incredibly risky. No wonder Mobile ESPN is having trouble.
These start-ups are betting they can lure users from current calling plans of Verizon or Cingular, for example, just to get the video content on the start-up network. I would have expected these firms to license their content to existing providers. Maybe, if they fail at their own networks, that's what they will revert to doing.
I have a feeling that the coming wave of mobile video is going to look an awfully lot like the first wave of internet retailing did in the late 1990s.
Yesterday's Wall Street Journal featured a piece that described the troubles of several new mobile media companies, including one involving ESPN.
While I continue to believe that an insufficient number of people will pay to watch large amounts of content on cell phones, I did not realize there is an additional wrinkle to these companies.
They are forming new mobile networks, using leased lines, to market their content. This seems incredibly risky. No wonder Mobile ESPN is having trouble.
These start-ups are betting they can lure users from current calling plans of Verizon or Cingular, for example, just to get the video content on the start-up network. I would have expected these firms to license their content to existing providers. Maybe, if they fail at their own networks, that's what they will revert to doing.
I have a feeling that the coming wave of mobile video is going to look an awfully lot like the first wave of internet retailing did in the late 1990s.
Monday, June 19, 2006
Oil's New Rules: Sovereign Producers Change The Game
I read last week's Wall Street Journal article on the changing nature of oil supply and demand with great interest, and I am sure I am not alone in that regard.
The picture painted by the piece is quite dark. America experiencing both the loss of substantial, easily-accessible quantities of oil, while also remaining a major consumer of oil, though by no means now necessarily the only large one. Add to this the knowledge that several other major consumers, India and China, are also paying up for access to, or ownership of, oil reserves, and the picture gets almost totally black.
Or does it?
Back in the 1960s and before, the era with which the article contrasts the present situation, the phrase "global economy" had nowhere near the same meaning it does today. Without repeating a lot of economic history which can be found elsewhere, suffice to say that the world's major economies are far, far more intertwined today than they were even 30 years ago, let alone 40+ years ago.
I suspect this matters in the case of oil supply and demand. Oil is an industrial input, as well as a consumer good. Suppose China gained ownership of most of the oil reserves needed to slake its thirst, to the exclusion of America. What then? Would not the corresponding slowdown in US industrial production and consumer consumption boomerang right back onto the very China which had caused the shortage? And would this not ratchet down their own economic activity level, wealth, standards of living, etc?
When the Saudis had that kind of power, all they would lose was money they didn't really need to spend. The Saudi economy didn't so much depend upon selling non-energy goods to the Americans, as the Indian and Chinese economies currently do. Now, the Saudis want to develop energy-related industries, but here, too, it's not clear they will benefit from this in the long term. The Chinese and Indians are different. If their exploitation of the ownership of oil reserves gets too draconian, the global economy will come crashing down on everyone's head, not just the the victim countries who don't own sufficient oil reserves.
Furthermore, those countries paying for long term oil supplies at nearly $70/bbl are now locked into those energy costs. So are their petrochemicals, and other goods and services downstream which require the oil feedstock or refined petroleum. Doesn't that mean that, if oil were to decline just to, say, $60/bbl, those countries are now at a $70/60 price disadvantage? Are not the sectors of their economies which used oil all going to be overpriced, relative to those countries acquiring supply on the spot or more near term forward markets?
How is locking in oil reserves at a high price different from: S&L's locking in deposits with high long term rates on the liabilities, or; insurance companies locking in investment product customers with unsustainable rates on GIC (guaranteed investment contracts), or; utilities securing long term natural gas supplies at historically high prices? Haven't we seen each of these three scenarios wreck a sector or some companies in the US sometime in the last 30 years?
If so, why shouldn't China and India meet similar fates if their recent acquisition of oil supplies prove to be at historically unsustainably high prices?
I may be wrong, and the US may truly be on the economic skids, thanks simply to its dependence on oil which it does not own nor to which it is not buying access. But something about the interlocking nature of the current global economy leads me to suspect that the end game is not as simple as the WSJ article makes it out to be.
For everyone's welfare, let's hope I'm onto something, and that the article's author overlooked some key differences between the 1960s' and today's global economy.
The picture painted by the piece is quite dark. America experiencing both the loss of substantial, easily-accessible quantities of oil, while also remaining a major consumer of oil, though by no means now necessarily the only large one. Add to this the knowledge that several other major consumers, India and China, are also paying up for access to, or ownership of, oil reserves, and the picture gets almost totally black.
Or does it?
Back in the 1960s and before, the era with which the article contrasts the present situation, the phrase "global economy" had nowhere near the same meaning it does today. Without repeating a lot of economic history which can be found elsewhere, suffice to say that the world's major economies are far, far more intertwined today than they were even 30 years ago, let alone 40+ years ago.
I suspect this matters in the case of oil supply and demand. Oil is an industrial input, as well as a consumer good. Suppose China gained ownership of most of the oil reserves needed to slake its thirst, to the exclusion of America. What then? Would not the corresponding slowdown in US industrial production and consumer consumption boomerang right back onto the very China which had caused the shortage? And would this not ratchet down their own economic activity level, wealth, standards of living, etc?
When the Saudis had that kind of power, all they would lose was money they didn't really need to spend. The Saudi economy didn't so much depend upon selling non-energy goods to the Americans, as the Indian and Chinese economies currently do. Now, the Saudis want to develop energy-related industries, but here, too, it's not clear they will benefit from this in the long term. The Chinese and Indians are different. If their exploitation of the ownership of oil reserves gets too draconian, the global economy will come crashing down on everyone's head, not just the the victim countries who don't own sufficient oil reserves.
Furthermore, those countries paying for long term oil supplies at nearly $70/bbl are now locked into those energy costs. So are their petrochemicals, and other goods and services downstream which require the oil feedstock or refined petroleum. Doesn't that mean that, if oil were to decline just to, say, $60/bbl, those countries are now at a $70/60 price disadvantage? Are not the sectors of their economies which used oil all going to be overpriced, relative to those countries acquiring supply on the spot or more near term forward markets?
How is locking in oil reserves at a high price different from: S&L's locking in deposits with high long term rates on the liabilities, or; insurance companies locking in investment product customers with unsustainable rates on GIC (guaranteed investment contracts), or; utilities securing long term natural gas supplies at historically high prices? Haven't we seen each of these three scenarios wreck a sector or some companies in the US sometime in the last 30 years?
If so, why shouldn't China and India meet similar fates if their recent acquisition of oil supplies prove to be at historically unsustainably high prices?
I may be wrong, and the US may truly be on the economic skids, thanks simply to its dependence on oil which it does not own nor to which it is not buying access. But something about the interlocking nature of the current global economy leads me to suspect that the end game is not as simple as the WSJ article makes it out to be.
For everyone's welfare, let's hope I'm onto something, and that the article's author overlooked some key differences between the 1960s' and today's global economy.
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